THE UNION OF EUROPE; ITS PROGRESS, PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS, AND PLACE IN THE WESTERN WORLD

REPORT

TAMBERS IN THE OF THE MOTIVATION AND THE

MEETINGS BETWEEN A DELEGATION APPOINTED BY
THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS AS AUTHORIZED BY
S. CON. RES. 36 AND REPRESENTATIVES APPOINTED
BY THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL
OF EUROPE, NOVEMBER 1951



PRESENTED BY SENATOR THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE DELEGATION

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

On May 12, 1951, the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe passed a resolution suggesting that arrangements be made for public discussions by delegations from the United States Congress and from the Consultative Assembly of problems of common interest to the United States and Western Europe. (See appendix I for resolution of Consultative Assembly.) After preliminary meetings between representatives of the Congress and the Consultative Assembly, the United States Congress on October 18, 1951, authorized the appointment by the respective presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives of 14 Members of the Congress to meet with representatives of the 14 nation Consultative Assembly. (See appendix II for S. Con. Res. 36.)

Accordingly, the following Senators were appointed by the Vice President of the United States and the following Representatives by the Speaker of the House of Representatives to serve as representatives

of the Congress at these meetings:

Senators:

Theodore Francis Green, Rhode Island, Democrat, Chairman.

Brien McMahon, Connecticut, Democrat,
Hubert H. Humphrey, Minnesota, Democrat.
William Benton, Connecticut, Democrat.
Alexander Wiley, Wisconsin, Republican.
Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Iowa, Republican.
Robert C. Hendrickson, New Jersey, Republican.

Representatives:

Howard Smith, Virginia, Democrat, Chairman.
Howard Smith, Virginia, Democrat.
Donald O'Toole, New York, Democrat.
Frazier Reams, Ohio, Independent.
Walter Judd, Minnesota, Republican.
Harris Ellsworth, Oregon, Republican.
Kenneth Keating, New York, Republican.

The delegation was accompanied by Mr. Carl Marcy, of the staff of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Mrs. Althea Eccles, secretary to the House delegation; Mr. Horace Smith, Senate liaison officer of the Department of State; and Col. James Wilson, of the United States Air Force. Minister James W. Riddleberger, Acting Deputy U. S. Special Representative in Europe of the Economic Cooperation Administration, also accompanied the party.

So far as the committee is aware this is the first occasion when an official delegation from the United States Congress has participated in discussions of this kind with representatives of an organization

like the Council of Europe.

After acceptance of the invitation, the group of Congressmen who had been appointed to represent the Congress at the meetings was invited by the German Bundestag to meet with representatives of the Bundestag and other German officials in Bonn, Germany. Subsequently, the Austrian Government invited the same group to visit the Austrian Government in Vienna. Each of these invitations was accepted. (See appendix III for invitations.)

Upon completion of the official visits to Bonn and Vienna, and of the meetings with representatives of the Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg, some members of the group proceeded to Italy and North Africa for first-hand information on conditions there. (See appendix

IV for complete itinerary.)

The report which follows is concerned primarily with the activities and conclusions of the joint congressional delegation which met with representatives of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe. In order that the report may be complete, however, sections have been included in the appendix dealing with the official visits in Bonn, Germany, and Vienna, Austria, as well as to the brief travel of some members of the group to parts of North Africa.

A. Conference at Strasbourg Between Delegations of the Congress of the United States of America and of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe.

1. Background on the Council of Europe.

The Council of Europe was established by a treaty signed in London on May 5, 1949. Original signatories of the treaty were Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Subsequently, Greece, Turkey, Iceland, and Western Germany became members, thus making a present membership of 14 states, plus the Saar which is an associate

member.

The Statute of the Council of Europe states that the aim of the Council "is to achieve a greater unity between its members for the purpose of safeguarding and realizing the ideals and principles which are their common heritage and facilitating their economic and social progress." The principal organs of the Council of Europe are (1) the Committee of Ministers, consisting of the foreign ministers of member governments, and (2) the Consultative Assembly, made up of members appointed by the parliaments of member states. These

two organs are serviced by the secretariat-general.

The Consultative Assembly is described in the Statute of the Council as "the deliberative organ of the Council of Europe." As such it may discuss and make recommendations within the scope of the aims of the organization. Except with respect to internal organizational matters, the actions of the Consultative Assembly are in the nature of recommendations to the Council of Ministers and through them to their respective governments. While the Consultative Assembly has no substantive powers of its own, the importance of its recommendatory resolutions must not be underestimated.

The Committee of Ministers, made up of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the participating governments, may on its own initiative or in response to recommendations from the Consultative Assembly take action to further the aims of the Council of Europe including the conclusion of conventions and the adoption of common policies with regard to particular matters. The Committee of Ministers derives its power principally from the fact that the members are Foreign Ministers and as such are in a position to attempt to bring the policies of their governments into line with recommendations of the Consultative Assembly, accepted by the Council of Ministers. It follows that to a large extent the strength or weakness of the Council of Europe depends upon the attitude of the governments making up the organization and their willingness to take positive steps to give the Council real power.

Aside from the actual powers of the Council which are in fact extremely limited, it does gain some influence by reason of the important position it occupies in formulating a common public opinion in

Western Europe.

The nature of the activities of the Council of Europe is illustrated by the following summary of its work since August 1949, as set forth in a pamphlet issued by the Directorate of Information of the Council of Europe:

In the economic field proposals for a European monetary union approved by the Economic Committee of the Assembly were closely reflected in the final agreement reached between members of the O. E. E. C. for a European Payments Union (1950). Resolutions passed by the Economic Committee of the Assembly concerning steel and the creation of European companies together with the existence of an assembly of European parliamentarians with German participation are factors which have influenced the Schuman plan. It is no exaggeration to say that conditions realized within the Council of Europe have permitted the French Minister for Foreign Affairs to formulate his proposal. Discussions on and around the plan have taken place in the Council and these, with the relevant recommendations and resolutions adopted by the Consultative Assembly, played an essential role in the conduct of negotiations which terminated (April 18, 1951) in the signature of the treaty creating the European Community of Coal and Steel. A further protocol to this treaty settles the future relations of the Council of Europe with the European Community of Coal and Steel. A recent recommendation of the Assembly has called for the creation of close links between the Council of Europe and the proposed Iron and Steel Authority. Recommendations have been made for the coordination of European transport, for a European policy for agriculture and for the development of a policy of full employment in member states of the Council of Europe. In May 1951, the Assembly, following a request from the Committee of Ministers for its views, adopted a draft European Convention for the reciprocal treatment of nationals. This convention would in practice establish a European citizenship. In the field of human rights, respect for which is the corner stone of the statute of the Council of Europe, a European convention has been signed by the Committee of Ministers, inspired by proposals advanced by the Assembly. This convention is not merely limited to a statement of the essential human rights which are fundamental to democracy. It provides for the legal machinery necessary to ensure that they are respected. It is therefore the veritable charter of demo-cratic Europe. Further proposals have been made for a European code of social security, for a European policy for refugees, for the extension of cultural agreements between member states and for the peaceful settlement of disputes between members of the Council of Europe.

In reply to a message from the Committee of Ministers (August 1950) proposing that the Assembly should declare its sympathy with the policy of the United Nations over Korea, the Assembly approved a recommendation for the immediate creation of a European army under the authority of a European Minister of Defense subject to European democratic control. Another recommendation stated that German participation in defense is only conceivable within the framework of a permanent European defense organization under democratic political control and that no discrimination must be made between the participating

nowers.

The Assembly (August 1950) passed a recommendation calling for the institution of Specialized Authorities, within the framework of the Council of Europe,

which should be competent respectively in the political, economic, social, legal, and cultural fields. Adherence to these Authorities would be optional for all members of the Council of Europe. This was approved in principle by the Committee of Ministers (November 1950) and the Assembly subsequently instructed two special committees to prepare the texts of draft agreements for the institution of Specialized Authorities for Transport and Agriculture.

2. The invitation from the Consultative Assembly and its acceptance by the United States Congress

The resolution passed by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe in May 1951 expressed the belief—

that it would be of the greatest interest for public opinion in the democracies if these problems of common interest were to be discussed by delegations from the two Houses of Congress of the United States and from the Consultative Assembly.

The Secretary-General of the Council was instructed to see what arrangements could be made—

for such a discussion to take place * * * in accordance with an agenda drawn up in advance by agreement between officers of the Congress of the United States and the Bureau of the Consultative Assembly. (See appendix I.)

In June 1951, Lord Layton, a Vice President of the Consultative Assembly, visited Washington and discussed the proposed meeting with the Vice President of the United States and the Speaker of the House of Representatives and with some Members of Congress. Resolutions were introduced in both Houses authorizing the acceptance of the invitation from the Consultative Assembly. Subsequently, M. Paul-Henri Spaak, President of the Consultative Assembly, accompanied by Lord Layton, met on September 13, 1951, with representatives of both Houses of Congress and it was agreed that the subject of the proposed meeting would be: "The Union of Europe; its progress, problems, prospects, and the place in the Western World". (See appendix V for minutes of this meeting.)

Senate Concurrent Resolution 36 was approved by the Congress

on October 18, 1951. It provided—

That not to exceed 14 Members of Congress shall be appointed to meet jointly with the representatives appointed by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe for public discussion of problems of common interest. * * * (See appendix II.)

The report of the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate (Rept. No. 889, 82d Cong., 1st sess.) stated that during discussions which members of its subcommittee had held with representatives of the Consultative Assembly—

it was made crystal clear at all times that acceptance of the invitation from the Council of Europe constituted no commitments or obligations of any nature on the United States Congress.

The report also stated that the meetings should "involve no commitment on the part of Congress for any action" nor was the meeting to involve commitments "to any future meetings of this nature."

3. General nature of the meetings

Bearing in mind the report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and the debate in the House of Representatives which preceded adoption of Senate Concurrent Resolution 36, the United States delegation agreed that it should make clear to the representatives of the Consultative Assembly that no member of the delegation was authorized to speak for the Government of the United States or for the

Congress, and that any views expressed during the debates were the

individual views of the member expressing them.

Senator Green made this clear in his opening statement to the meeting and in a press release which he issued on November 18 on behalf of himself and the delegation. In that release he stated:

Our group, which includes Senators chosen by the Vice President of the United States and Representatives chosen by the Speaker of the House of Representatives, represents all shades of public opinion in the United States. Our two great political parties will be represented at these meetings. However, in the discussions which will take place we will each speak as individuals. While we are an official delegation from the Congress, we do not speak for the Senate or for the House of Representatives or for the Congress, or for the United States Government, but only for ourselves individually. I trust this will always be understood.

This position was made clear to the European delegates throughout the debates.

The European delegation consisted of 18 delegates, members of the parliaments of their respective countries. (See appendix VI for biographies of European delegates.)

The following European countries were represented: Belgium, France, Irish Republic, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, and Western Germany.

The European representatives, like the American representatives, were unauthorized to speak for their respective countries. As a matter of fact, quite a number of the delegates represented not the government in power but the opposition to the existing government of their own country.

The meeting continued for 5 days, from the 19th to the 23d of November, and was characterized by very free and candid expressions

of opinion on the part of delegates from all the countries.

Agenda.—The agenda which had been chosen for the meeting was "The Union of Europe; its progress, problems, prospects, and its place in the Western World." In order that the delegations might address themselves to more specific problems, it was agreed at the first meeting to adopt the following agenda submitted by Messrs. Spaak and Green which served to guide discussions in the meetings:

1. General debate.

2. The political aspects of the joint defense of Europe. 3. The economic aspects and effects of rearmament.

4. The dollar gap; trade between Western and Eastern Europe.

5. Refugees and emigration.

6. Concluding debate. Each of these subjects is treated in some detail in the following sections of this report. However, as the primary purpose of the Council of Europe is the achievement of greater unity between its members and the encouragement of such unification was one of the principal reasons for the adoption of the resolution under which the United States delegation was appointed the debate centered largely on that subject.

The American delegation was deeply impressed with the view that both economic and political union of some character is vital to the defense of the Western European countries. It did not believe that any of these countries could thrive or survive independently of the others. The European delegates in the debates constantly discussed the manifold difficulties of unification. While it is undoubtedly true that the complications and difficulties of any union between these countries, either economic or political, present very intricate problems, yet on the other hand, the benefits which would flow from even a partial unification are so great and so manifest that no complications or objections should be permitted to stand in the way.

The Congress of the United States has repeatedly, in its bills for European aid, made it clear that one of the main purposes of the tremendous appropriations that it has made was to aid in unification

of the Western European countries.

At the conclusion of the debates, the delegation from the United States Congress unanimously agreed to the following statement which was incorporated in the proceedings of the Strasbourg meeting:

STRASBOURG, November 23, 1951.

STATEMENT BY AMERICAN DELEGATION

At the close of 5 days of conferences with the delegation from the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, the delegation from the United States Congress, bearing in mind that it does not represent the Congress but acts merely as a group of individuals who are Members of the Congress, expresses its deep and lasting gratitude for the opportunity of meeting here and the candor and cordiality with which the discussions have been conducted.

Further, we believe that the discussions have been most useful in clarifying the views of all participants and should prove most helpful when reported to the American Congress and American people.

We agree, however, with expressions of deep regret that more realistic progress has not been made toward European union, economic and political, and express the hope that the tendency may be overcome to emphasize the difficulties which stand in the way of economic and political integration, rather than the advantages that would flow from such action.

We think it may be suitable if we now reiterate the statement of policy set forth in the Mutual Security Act of 1951 which expressed the intent of the United

States Congress in the following words:

"In order to support the freedom of Europe through assistance which will further the carrying out of the plans for defense of the North Atlantic area, while at the same time maintaining the economic stability of the countries of the area so that they may meet their responsibilities for defense, and further to encourage the economic unification and the political federation of Europe * * * ." (See Appendix X for full excerpt.)

4. Elements conditioning the United States delegation's approach to the economic and political integration of Western Europe

The free nations of Western Europe may have had some question as to the precise attitude of the United States Government on the economic and political integration of Western Europe. While Americans as a general rule believe that Western Europe could increase its defensive strength and overcome many of its economic problems by a federation of the type which proved so successful in the United States, they have not been willing to do more than suggest this same program to Western Europe. This attitude is apparent if one reviews the legislation of recent years which has provided economic and military assistance to Western Europe.

The first Economic Cooperation Act in 1948 declared it to be the

policy of the-

people of the United States to sustain and strengthen principles of individual liberty * * *.

No mention was made of European unification. In 1949, however, this statement of policy was amended to read that it is the policy of the—

people of the United States to encourage the unification of Europe, and to sustain and strengthen principles of individual liberty * * (Public Law 47, 81st Cong., 1st sess.).

In 1950 this sentence was strengthened again by the insertion of the word "further," making the phrase read:

to encourage the further unification of Europe * * * (Public Law 535, 81st Cong., 2d sess.).

These slight word changes may not seem important to the casual observer. They are the result, however, of extensive discussions in the committees and on the floor of Congress which were concerned with this legislation.

On the one hand there was a body of opinion in Congress which believed that American aid to Western Europe should be made contingent upon some substantial degree of economic and political federation. This group felt that unless one of the direct results of American aid was to bring Western Europe more closely together in an economic and political federation, the aid being provided by the

United States would not bring forth its maximum benefits.

On the other hand, there was a body of opinion in Congress, supported by officials of the executive branch, which felt strongly that economic aid to Western Europe should not be tied to the strings of economic and political integration. They believed that if political and economic integration in Europe were to have real strength it must come from the people and their governments and could not be forced upon a people from the outside. Moreover, they were concerned lest conditions requiring integration which might be attached to economic aid might well provide communism with legal language which would be cited to show that American aid was imperialistic in nature.

The Mutual Security Act of 1951 for the first time stated that the funds authorized for economic and military assistance to Europe are

to be used in order

to further encourage the economic unification and the political federation of Europe * * *

The individual members of the American delegation were strongly influenced by this legislative history as they engaged in discussions with representatives of the Consultative Assembly. They questioned whether the "gentle approach" adopted in the earliest aid bills had produced the results needed or expected. Moreover, they encountered considerable opinion on the part of the European parliamentarians with whom they met that the United States should have been more forthright and insistent in earlier legislation that substantial steps be taken by Western Europe toward economic and political federation in return for the aid tendered.

While the American delegation was aware that the representatives with whom it met could be expected to be especially partial toward such integration by reason of their active participation in the Council of Europe, nevertheless it was led to conclude that the United States had been too gentle in the past in urging its point of view upon

Western Europe.

5. Encouraging factors regarding European integration

The American delegation found some evidence of real progress in Europe toward economic and political integration. When the history of Europe during the past 300 years is examined and compared with developments of the past 10 years, one cannot but be impressed by the vast changes in attitude that have taken place in a relatively short period of time. Throughout most of Europe's history she has been threatened by forced integration—sometimes by the French as under Napoleon and sometimes by the Germans as under Kaiser Wilhelm and Hitler. But today the people of Europe are themselves seeking to integrate their economic and political lives. True, it is in part the threat from the Soviet Union which forces them in this direction, but they are also being pushed by economic necessities unrelated to the threat from the Soviet Union.

The Council of Europe and in particular the Consultative Assembly has taken the lead in crystalizing this public sentiment. While it is difficult to measure in concrete terms the results achieved by the Council, the American delegation believes that the debates in the Assembly have done a great deal to encourage the peoples of free Europe to accept as possible such bold steps as those involved in the creation of

a European army or the acceptance of the Schuman plan.

It is undoubtedly also true that the planning and thinking of the Consultative Assembly and the Council of Ministers have been more progressive and more forward looking than the parliamentary bodies of the various countries, and perhaps ahead of the thinking of the people of those countries. While it was difficult for the American delegation on a purely official mission to make a proper appraisal of public sentiment, nevertheless, the impression received was that the rank and file of the people of these countries are more forward-looking and progressive on the question of unification than are the official representatives of their respective governments.

Specific steps taken by the Council which promote the integration of Western Europe include (1) the bringing of Western Germany into full Council membership; (2) the drafting of a convention of human rights subject to the collective guaranty of the members; (3) the adoption of a resolution favoring the creation of a European army within the framework of the Atlantic Pact; and (4) a decision that if constitutional federation is not possible, at least steps should be taken to set up international organs for specific, definite purposes.

The session of the Consultative Assembly which was held shortly after the Strasbourg conference between the delegations from the United States and from the Consultative Assembly took a series of actions along lines suggested by the American delegation at Strasbourg. It adopted a number of resolutions, including one on the establishment of a European authority for agriculture; another on the establishment of a postal union between members; another on a common policy for lower tariff barriers in Europe; another on setting up an association of European airline companies; another relative to the adoption of a common policy in social matters; and another for the adoption of a new statute for the Council of Europe. These resolutions as well as several others of interest are reprinted in the appendix to this report so that Members of Congress may see the type of action now being taken by the European Assembly designed to encourage the economic and political integration of free Europe. (See appendix VII.)

Outside of the Council activities there are a number of other factors which encourage the belief that closer integration may be possible. The recent approval by the French Assembly and the German Bundestag of the Schuman plan, for example, the steps being taken by General Eisenhower under the North Atlantic Treaty to build an international army, and the faltering, but none-the-less encouraging, steps being taken toward the creation of a European army, the action of the Benelux countries in removing trade barriers between them, and the development of the Intra-European Payments Union, are all steps which would have been inconceivable even 10 years ago and which it is believed were advanced by these discussions at Strasbourg.

German attitude.—One of the encouraging factors which the joint committee found on the matter of the integration of Europe was the attitude of the German Government. During the several days spent in Bonn, there was opportunity to discuss with members of the German Bundestag and of the Government the position taken by them on steps which might be taken to bring Western Europe more closely together.

Mr. Von Brentano, one of the German representatives at the meetings in Strasbourg, summed up the German attitude toward a European

army in these words:

* * the various parties in Germany, including my own (CDU), (are) opposed to the reconstitution of a German Army, but (are) in favor of the participation of Germany in the formation of a European army in which German forces would be integrated not only with those of European nations, but also with the free forces of associated nations, for the purpose of joint defense of our rights.

On the subject of the political and economic federation of Europe, the joint committee was again impressed with the general willingness of Germany to proceed as "good Europeans." In the words of Mr. Von Brentano:

If Europe does not become integrated, does not pool its immense knowledge, experience, populations, and history for the benefit of such integration, this Europe of ours will be destroyed and will disappear in what may be likened to an atomic explosion.

While the joint committee is fully aware that the past actions of Germany may well cause concern to many free Europeans and that neo-Fascist movements in some parts of Germany today may give substance to these fears, it believes that a free and democratic Germany must participate in full partnership with other nations of Western Europe if any real progress is to be made toward effective integration of Western Europe.

6. Discouraging factors regarding European integration

Despite a number of actions during recent years that indicate Western Europe is moving closer together in the face of the Soviet threat, the joint committee found many factors which tend to dis-

courage unification.

The delegation was greatly concerned at the emphasis which a number of the European representatives placed on the difficulties in the way of unification. Senator Green in his closing remarks at the Conference spoke of the "rather depressed feeling which I sense on the part of some of you." He said:

Instead of looking forward, instead of believing that Europe can overcome its difficulties, instead of planning adequately for the future with hope, there has been too much talk of the difficulties of today. * * *

Representative Smith of Virginia in his final remarks to the Conference voiced the same thought:

* * I came here with high hopes, and I came here to talk about the unification of Europe, and to hear you talk about the unification of Europe. I must say in all frankness that, while I thought we were going to talk about how it can be done, most of what I have heard is how it cannot be done. I have heard all the objections, all the difficulties. We all know about all the objections and all the difficulties; but I had hoped that you would get down to brass tacks, as we say in my country, and talk about how this great purpose could be accomplished * * * We have inquired what progress has been made in that respect as we have gone through different countries in Europe, and I am sorry to say that the answers, if not evasive, have not been satisfactory in pointing to any progress of a material sort that has been accomplished * * *. We have not talked here about how it can be done. We have been talking about how it cannot be done.

The American delegation was deeply conscious of the difficulties of political and economic integration. It was aware that the divisive tendencies of generations cannot be overcome in a year. James Madison wrote in 1788:

The provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate with the danger of the attack.

The American delegation felt that the great danger Western Europe faces today is not that her actions may be too bold, but rather that they may not be bold enough to meet the dangers which Europe faces either from external aggression or from internal disintegration.

The attitude of the United Kingdom.—The delegation was disappointed with the apparent attitude of the United Kingdom toward

joining any further movement toward European unification.

The United Kingdom is not a participant in the proposed Schuman plan. It has likewise indicated that it cannot fully participate in the formation of a European army. In fact, as many of the representatives of other European countries suggested, the position of the United Kingdom seems to be that she wishes to be "associated with" any European political federation, specialized agency, or army that the Europeans themselves may create, but does not wish to become part and

parcel of any such arrangement.

This attitude not only affects Britain, but also is a deterrent to Sweden, Norway, and Ireland. Most of the delegation had expected to find Great Britain in the forefront of the movement for unification. It felt justified in this thought by the history of the organization of the Council of Europe, of which Great Britain is a member, and in which Winston Churchill played such an important, constructive role in the early days of the organization. Aside from the vital importance of Great Britain to such a union, the fact is that during the debates in Strasbourg the European nations almost without exception pointed to the reluctant attitude of the United Kingdom as a nearly insurmountable obstacle to unification. Of course, it is possible that if the United Kingdom did join, the other countries might find additional reasons for not going along, but the major obstacle pointed out repeatedly was that it would be difficult for such a union to function successfully without full participation by the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden, and Ireland.

The delegation was the more puzzled at the present attitude of the United Kingdom because in 1940, Great Britain, under the stress of

war, offered to France full federation, political and economic, which France declined at that time.

7. Relationship between the North Atlantic Treaty organization, European Federation and the "Atlantic Union"

While representatives from the United Kingdom explained their attitude toward close affiliation with European federation on the basis of defense and close ties with the Commonwealth nations, it is likely that to some extent the British attitude is dictated by uncertainty as to the future of the Atlantic community. One of the British delegates asked the American delegation, "What do you really mean to do about the Atlantic community?"

This question has two aspects. In the first place many Britons are concerned about whether they should take seriously the Atlantic Union resolution which has been supported by a large number of Members of Congress. Second, they are concerned about what powers.

and in what way NATO is to be furnished.

Mr. Boothby, one of the British delegates, commented on this situation to the American delegation as follows:

Now, let me disabuse your minds, I hope once and for all, of the idea that we in Britain want to ride into the Atlantic community by riding out of Europe. We do not. We know we cannot. We know it is the one certain way of not being able to build up an Atlantic Union. If we are going to join an Atlantic Union, we have got to bring Europe with us, otherwise you will not have us. We know that. Europe is vital; but there is also NATO, and NATO is where the real power lies, NATO is what we all depend upon for our security and existence. [See official record of debates of Conference of Strasbourg, p. 217, hereafter cited as official record.]

This shows how seriously many Britons consider proposals regard-

ing Atlantic Union.

There are three different European or Atlantic community international organizations which are being developed or contemplated today: The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe, and the Atlantic Union. The first two of these organizations are already in existence although their powers have not been fully defined. The third, Atlantic Union, is an idea in men's minds which has such strong support in certain quarters that it influences efforts to spell out more fully the powers of NATO and the Council of Europe.

It can scarcely be said that the development of these organizational concepts has taken place in a well-ordered and coherent pattern. While each has been developed to help build strength in the free Western World, membership is (or would be in the case of Atlantic Union) different, the emphasis on the fundamental purposes of the organization is different, and the authority delegated to the organiza-

tion is different.

As to membership, there is considerable overlapping between the Council of Europe and the Atlantic Pact; the main differences being that Sweden, Ireland, and Western Germany are not members of the NATO whereas NATO includes the United States, Canada, and Portugal in its membership. Atlantic Union is more exclusive in its proposed selection of delegates to meet in a federal convention, as can be seen from the accompanying chart.

Council of Europe	Atlantic Pact	Atlantic Union 3
Great Britain France Netherlands Belgium Luxemburg Norway Sweden Denmark (celand treland taly Greece Trurkey Western Germany saar 2	Great Britain France Netherlands Belgium Luxemburg Norway Denmark Iceland Italy Greece 1 Turkey 1	Great Britain, France, Netherlands, Belgium. Luxemburg,
oue enotest emessante Amah A. eda erten eme	Canada	Canada. United States.

¹Proposed for membership.
²Associate member.
³List taken from pending Senate resolution, which provides, however, that other States may be invited to join.

In general people think of NATO as a defense organization, the Council of Europe as a political or economic organization, and the proposed Atlantic Union as primarily political in nature. In fact, however, the North Atlantic Treaty has language broad enough to encourage some individuals to believe that it can grow into the type of organization proposed by proponents of Atlantic Union. Article 2 of the North Atlantic Treaty provides that "The parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations * * * by promoting conditions of stability and well-being" and "will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them." They are also pledged in article 3 to "maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack." This is language broad enough to be interpreted as encouraging, and perhaps authorizing, political and economic collaboration of the closest type.

The statute of the Council of Europe states that "matters relating to national defense do not fall within the scope of the Council of Europe." As a matter of practice, however, the Consultative Assembly has fully and freely discussed economic and political aspects of defense and in 1950 it adopted a resolution favoring the creation of a European Army. Thus the Council is getting involved in the defense business of NATO.

When one of the British representatives at the meetings asked what the United States really means to do about the Atlantic community, he undoubtedly had in mind the type of organization which was described in 1950 by Mr. Justice Roberts when he appeared before a subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Mr. Roberts spoke of a union whose powers might include-

(1) A union defense force and foreign policy; (2) a union free market; (3) a union currency; (4) a union postal system; (5) a union citizenship, in addition to national citizenship; and (6) a union power of taxation

The American delegation could not answer the question of what the United States really means to do about Atlantic Union. But the fact that the question was put indicates to some extent the impact which the idea of Atlantic Union has on the thinking of many leading European parliamentarians.

Enough has been written here to indicate the confusion that exists in the nations bordering the North Atlantic on the general subject of the type of organization or organizations, if any, which need to be created if the free Atlantic States are to develop to the maximum their ability to defend themselves against the military, economic, and

political threats of international communism.

The United Kingdom is caught in the midst of this maelstrom of ideas. She is a member of the Council of Europe, of NATO, and would presumably be a charter member of any Atlantic Union. England draws away from any further political involvement in Western Europe. She does not know what NATO or Atlantic Union may hold for the future. She would probably rather develop close political and economic ties with the United States and the Commonwealths than with Western Europe but she is not sure of the position of the United States with respect to any of these organizational concepts.

Lord Layton posed the British dilemma in these words:

So long as we are in the realm of general terms, the mind of the public is confused * * * If we could define the functions of NATO so that it was no longer confused with a constitutional federation of the Atlantic world, and so that there was no longer the idea that there was an alternative and greater federation in which they could join, then I believe that we should find it much easier to go ahead with the creation of a united Europe. I ask that our American friends should think the matter out in those terms. That is one of the

things that America can do to help us." [Official Record, p. 233.]

Several years ago it was said, half in jest, that if the Soviet were to attack the west there would be no soldiers to defend the free world but there would be committees enough to provide adequate defense. Today as one looks at the political organization of Western Europe and the Atlantic community he cannot but be impressed by the organizational confusion that frustrates the creation of any coherent pattern for the development of a strong, well ordered, democratic community capable of exerting the tremendous efforts that are essential if freedom is to survive.

It may be that the organizational chaos in the North Atlantic community today is a chaos out of which order will flow. It may be but a step in the evolution of a community of free nations dedicated to the preservation of individual freedom. But the danger we face is so great that it may be fatal to wait for evolutionary processes to develop a free united Europe, or an Atlantic community, or any other combination of states that would pool some degree of sovereignty for

common purposes.

It seems clear that the relationships between NATO, the Council of Europe, and the proposed Atlantic Union give rise to many questions that have not been thought through. How far does the United States propose to go with NATO? Is the United States seriously giving consideration to the type of political federation that would be involved in Atlantic Union? Are the congressional sponsors, as well as the American public, fully aware of the sovereign powers the United States would be expected to relinquish if some degree of Atlantic Union were to be adopted? Is the United States aware of the full implications of European federation? Might not such a federation, for example, strengthen Communist parties within the participating countries because they would have unified direction and at the same time weaken the democratic parties which by their very

nature would not be subject to totalitarian control? Would moves involving the relinquishment of power in foreign or domestic fields

raise more perplexing questions than they would solve?

The American delegation came away from its discussions in Strasbourg more fully aware than ever before of the tremendous problems to be faced if European federation is to make any real progress. It draws attention in this report to the existing confusion with respect to the organization of free Western Europe and to some of the questions that have not been answered, not for the purpose of adding to the confusion, but rather to try to focus the attention of the American people, the executive branch of the Government, and the Congress on this total situation.

The delegation has found no clear American policy with respect to these matters. In fact, there seems to be considerable difference of opinion among responsible American officials here and abroad as to the course this Government either is pursuing or should pursue. The delegation, by focusing attention on some of the profound questions which must be answered, hopes to encourage the responsible agencies of this Government, including the Congress, to take action that will enable the United States to exercise the leadership in this fold which is so haddy modeled.

field which is so badly needed.

8. The Dollar Gap.

One of the subjects discussed by the participants at Strasbourg was the dollar gap. As Mr. Ohlin, the representative from Sweden, remarked, "The lack of balance between the European economies and the economy of the United States is not a new phenomenon." Despite the unsurpassed generosity of Marshall aid, Mr. Ohlin concluded that "a stable equilibrium in Europe's balance with the United States" has not been reached.

While, in part, the current dollar shortage is attributable to the impact of rearmament on the European economy, there is considerable doubt as to whether an equilibrium in trade would in fact have been

established even had there been no rearmament effort.

The general position taken by the European representatives was that there were a number of actions which the United States could take which would simplify European efforts to overcome the dollar shortage. For example, one of the European representatives suggested that the United States "is in a financial position which makes it possible for this great country to take the lead in lowering all obstacles to international trade." Another suggested that the United States could in effect make dollars available to Western Europe by purchasing more military equipment in Europe, that is, by "offshore procurement." There is also the matter of raw materials, the prices of which have gone up very rapidly as the result of the American demand. These higher prices have increased costs of production to European manufacturers and thereby contributed to the dollar shortage.

The American delegation, without denying that these are factors which may contribute to the dollar shortage in Europe, felt nevertheless that there are a good many things which Europeans can and must do for themselves. Europeans must not expect the United States to solve the dollar problem for them. One of the American delegation, Senator Hickenlooper, referred to the "dollar gap" in the United States, pointing out that the United States Government has operated

at a deficit every year but two since 1931. The United States has been increasing the national debt year after year, while many European

countries have been decreasing their internal debt.

While the European representatives urged that the United States continue to lower its tariffs and simplify its customs procedures so that European goods might more easily be sold for dollars in the American market, the American delegation pointed out that the United States has, in fact, through its reciprocal-trade-agreements program, taken the lead in recent years in efforts to lower trade barriers. Moreover, the American delegation invited attention to the trade barriers which European countries impose as between themselves—barriers sometimes taking the form of tariffs, and at other times taking the form of quotas and dual prices. The American delegation felt that the Council of Europe should continue to urge upon its members the reciprocal lowering of tariff barriers and the elimination of quantitative restrictions on imports.

The delegation noted with particular interest recommendation 11 which was adopted by the Consultative Assembly at its last sitting (see appendix VII) which makes specific recommendations looking toward greater freedom of trade within Europe. To the extent that Western European countries can increase trade as among themselves it should be possible for them to decrease their common need for

dollars.

One of the American delegation remarked during the discussion of tariffs that he seriously doubted whether the complete removal of tariffs by the United States on goods from Western Europe would contribute in any substantial way to the elimination of the dollar shortage of Western Europe. He observed that the restrictive business practices common in many European countries so stifle competition and efficient production that there would be very few things, other than highly specialized products, which could be sold in the United States in the face of the competitive ability of the American businessman.

The American delegation was depressed to learn of the strangle-hold which some trade associations and investment trusts have on the business life and governments of many Western European states. In several states it is impossible for an enterprising young man to get started in business for himself because he must have a license from the state to do business. Before such a license is issued the government requests the advice of the interested trade association and in all too many cases that advice, which may be based upon fear of new com-

petition, is followed by the government.

In the field of banking, not only are interest rates prohibitively high, but in fact in many cases the banks own the very industries that would be faced with competition if the bank were to make certain loans. Under these circumstances it is almost impossible for a new company to begin business or for an existing company to take steps that might increase its productivity to the detriment of other existing concerns.

Although the United States beginning with the first lend-lease agreements has consistently inserted provisions in such agreements which speak of discouraging restrictive business practices, yet the fact is that very little has been done by Europe. This means that

much of the American aid given to these countries to help put them on their feet and to restore a trade equilibrium with the dollar areas has not been put into business communities which had any fundamental desire to increase their productivity if it meant that their

short-term profits would be endangered.

It is perhaps hard for Americans weaned on a competitive system to understand the deep-seated tradition which permeates many European business communities. Such a tradition cannot be elimininated overnight. However, when restrictive business practices of the type rampant in so many Western European countries mean that more American dollars are necessary to avoid the unrest that invites Communist penetration, Americans should not let a "long tradition" stand in the way of forthright remedial measures that may hurt a few but in fact benefit the many.

The United States should not subsidize economic practices which discourage achievement of the very productivity needed if Europe

is to become self-dependent again.

The American delegation could not help but feel that if the present free governments of Western Europe do not move quickly to eliminate many of these restrictive business practices, there is great danger that the people will turn toward the false promises of the Communists.

Intimately related to the dollar gap is the problem of east-west trade. This was a subject to which the Strasbourg meetings did not have time to give sufficient attention. The tables which appear in the appendix (see appendix VIII) show that although the total level of legal or reported Western European imports from Eastern Europe is only about one-fourth of what it was in 1938 and that exports are slightly more than half the 1938 figure, Western Europe has been selling larger amounts of machinery to the East than in 1938. It is with this type of sale to Eastern Europe that the United States has been concerned.

The justification for this trade, according to the Economic Com-

mission for Europe, lies—

in the fact * * * that Eastern Europe is a potential source of basic commodities which can otherwise be obtained only against payment in dollars.

In other words, the European representatives implied that the extent the United States seeks to prevent east-west trade which might produce goods needed in the west—especially coal, grain, and timber—it may be necessary for the United States itself to make up shortages which would result if this trade were terminated, or face the consequences. Mr. Finn Moe, of Norway, posed this situation in these words:

* * all European delegates here will agree that no raw materials of specially vital strategic importance should be exported to the Eastern European countries; but on the other hand, if you widen this to include materials of only civil importance, the only thing one can say is that to the same extent as you block east-west trade you increase the dollar gap (official record, p. 168).

The American delegation was fully aware of the impact of decreased east-west trade upon the dollar gap. It could not forget, however, that there is considerable evidence that some of the strategic materials and machinery shipped from Western Europe to the east in past years has in fact been used against United Nations forces in Korea. While the delegation recognized that preventing the shipment

of many materials between the east and the west interferes with trade routes that are centuries old, it felt that the Battle bill, which was passed during the last session of the Congress and which seeks strictly to control trade in strategic materials, sets a proper pattern. Unlimited trade may be desirable but the defense of the west must be our first consideration.

9. European refugees

One of the matters discussed during the meetings at Strasbourg was that of the more than 11,000,000 refugees now living in countries which are members of the Council of Europe. These refugees fall

into two general groups.

The first group, known as displaced persons, is made up principally of persons who were displaced as the result of the war. It includes many workers brought to Germany during the war. It is this group for which the International Refugee Organization (IRO) has principal responsibility.

The second group is made up of refugees referred to as "national refugees." These are persons who live as refugees in another part of the country to which they belong. Persons who have fled from

Eastern to Western Germany belong to this group.

The first of these groups has now been reduced to about 1,000,000 persons. The second group consists of about 10,000,000 people, of whom about 9,000,000 are in Western Germany. It is this group in Germany which presents the most immediate and pressing refugee problem facing the west and to which most of the discussion was directed.

Since this report cannot hope to present as careful an analysis of this problem as that being prepared by a subcommittee of the House Judiciary Committee which has been studying the matter for several years, there are recorded here only a few of the reactions of the American delegation to the refugee problem as posed by the European delegation.

Members of the American delegation took the position, in general, that Europe must take the leadership in solving the problem of refugees. Whether this is a subject to be handled through the organs of the Council of Europe or through the United Nations, for example, is a matter on which European thinking would be most important.

In answer to some of the European delegates' concern that these refugees contribute to Europe's surplus populations, several members of the American delegation observed that "surplus population merely means too many people for the land, with its industry, to support." Yet in fact the number of people that a country can support is in ratio to the productivity of the country. If a nation is able to increase its productivity, it will be able to support additional people. Thus in part, one answer to surplus populations may be an increase in the productivity of the nation.

Several members of the American delegation commented upon the great potential value of these refugees. They bring many skills with them. If given reasonable opportunities these skills may be put to use by the receiving state, enabling it to increase its economic wealth. It was pointed out that the United States is peopled by refugees from Europe and that the United States owes a great deal to the spirit of

enterprise of these people.

During the past year the United States appropriated \$10,000,000 as its contribution to the refugee problem. Whether additional help will be needed and the extent to which the Congress may be willing to authorize such help must depend upon a more thorough study of the problem than this delegation was able to make.

10. Conclusions

It is the general aim of the United States in providing assistance to Western Europe to help free Europe to build her economic and defensive military strength as rapidly as possible so that free Europe can defend itself from internal and external threats of aggression. European self-sufficiency in these regards is essential to the security of the United States. In efforts to achieve this end the Congress provided in the Mutual Security Act of 1951 that assistance is furnished in order to further "encourage the economic and the political federation of Europe * * *."

Within this general framework, the joint committee of the Congress which attended meetings with representatives of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe, unanimously reports these conclusions:

1. There is general confusion among the nations and peoples of Western Europe as to the respective roles of the Council of Europe, the NATO, and the proposed Atlantic Union, particularly with respect to the part each should play in building economic and defensive military strength in free Europe. To some extent this confusion may be attributable to lack of clarity as to the policies of both the United States and Great Britain.

2. Members of the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe are not agreed as to whether that organization should take immediate steps resulting in some degree of federation or proceed toward that ultimate goal on a project by project basis.

3. While it seems clear that as of the present time the United Kingdom does not expect to participate fully in any truly political federation which may be developed in Western Europe, there is considerable doubt also as to the nature and extent of British participation in organizations that may be established to deal with such specific suggestions as the Pleven plan, the Schuman plan, and the proposals for a European agricultural market.

4. Regardless of the attitude of the United Kingdom and certain other countries, the American delegation felt that those western European countries willing to move closer toward economic and political federation should do so as rapidly as possible.

5. The failure of western Europe to make more realistic progress toward European unification results in large part, in the opinion of the delegation, from a tendency to overemphasize the difficulties of unification and to underestimate the dangers that will inevitably flow from failure to unify.

6. While economic and military assistance for Western Europe is provided because a majority in Congress believe that it is in the best interests of the United States to provide such aid, it does not follow that assistance must be given without attaching conditions to that aid. Thus far Congress has not sought to make its aid conditional upon the achievement of some specific degree of economic or political federation in Western Europe. Whether such conditions should be at-

tached is a matter upon which the delegation does not express a conclusion; it notes for the record, however, that past legislative references to economic and political integration have not brought forth the positive achievements which many Members of Congress expected to flow from such references and other means may need to be chosen

to achieve those results.

7. The delegation did not believe that it was authorized to recommend whether or not additional meetings of this type should be held in the future and, if so, whether it would be proper for the Congress to invite a representative group from the Consultative Assembly to come to the United States. The exchange of views which took place in Strasbourg proved extremely helpful to members of the delegation. It enabled them to obtain information from representatives of the peoples of Western Europe in a direct way, not possible when the normal methods of diplomatic exchange are used. It also, we believe, has already helped to bring about greater progress toward the economic and political federation of Europe. In other words, the meeting proved to be a substantial success.

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APPENDIXES

A. VISIT TO FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

On October 24, 1951, after the designation of the official joint committee to participate in the meetings with representatives of the Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg, the President of the German Bundestag invited the American delegation to visit the Federal Republic of Germany as guests of the German Bundestag. (See appendix III.) The purpose of the visit was to give representatives of the Congress an opportunity to become acquainted with the institutions of the German Parliament and to visit with officials of the Federal Government and certain of the land governments.

The delegation was in Bonn, Germany, from November 10 through November 14 and then proceeded to Munich where it was the guest

of the Bayarian State Government.

While in Bonn, the delegation met with the Lord Mayor of Cologne, with the Minister President of the Land Northrhine-Westphalia (for discussions with representatives of German industry and trade unions), with Federal President Heuss, with Federal Chancelor Dr. Konrad Adenauer, with Vice Chancelor Dr. Franz Blucher, with President of the German Bundestag Dr. Hermann Ehlers, with President of the German Bundesrat Dr. Heinrich Kopf, and with a number of other German officials and members of the German parliamentary bodies. The delegation also met leaders of opposition parties in the Bundestag, including Dr. Kurt Schumacher.

Because of the relative brevity of the delegation's stay in Germany it was not possible to visit as many Germans outside official life as the group would have liked. However, the delegation was given many opportunities by its host, the German Bundestag, to discuss

problems of mutual concern with all interested officials.

Executive sessions were held with the Bundestag Committee on Refugee Matters and with the Committee on the Occupation Statute and European recovery program matters. At these meetings there was a frank and candid exchange of views during which the German legislators discussed some of the problems facing their committees. The American delegation also took the occasion to give the German representatives some of their individual views on various matters of concern to Germany. Because these sessions were secret, no account of them can be given in this report.

The highlight of the delegation's visit to Bonn was a plenary meeting of the German Bundestag at the end of the visit. The President of the Bundestag at this meeting spoke to the American delegation

of the_

new precedent in German parliamentary history that we in the German Parliament are able to bid welcome to an official delegation of both Houses of the Congress of the United States.

He told the group that-

the vast aid given to our people at the time of greatest need, immediately after the end of hostilities, by innumerable organizations and individuals of your people, will never be erased from our memories.

Senator Green, speaking on behalf of the American delegation and in response to the President of the Bundestag, told the Bundestag that he did not know—

of a welcome so cordial as you have given us this week, or of a series of international discussions more satisfactory.

He said:

The things we have done in Bonn, the things we have seen here, the people we have met here, the emotions aroused here, will do much to draw us closer together for the benefit of our respective nations.

B. VISIT TO AUSTRIA

When consideration was being given by the Congress to the possibility of sending a delegation to meet with the representatives of the Consultative Assembly at Strasbourg, Dr. Karl Gruber, the Austrian Foreign Minister, on behalf of his Government, suggested through the Secretary of State that if a group from Congress were to attend the meetings in Strasbourg, the Austrian Government should like to have the same group visit Austria as its guests. (See appendix III.) This invitation was accepted and the American delegation was the official guest of the Austrian Government from November 15 through November 17, at which time it departed for Strasbourg.

During the delegation's visit in Vienna it discussed problems of mutual concern with President Koerner, Chancelor Figl, Vice Chancelor Schaerf, Foreign Minister Gruber, members of the Austrian Parliament, and other officials of the Austrian Government. The United States High Commissioner Walter Donnelly and his staff also gave the delegation information on conditions in Austria.

Austria occupies one of the most critical areas of Western Europe. It projects the practice of freedom farther east than any other country in central Europe and by reason of that fact is able to give the people of Eastern Europe the idea of how they could live if they were made free again.

Although Austria is still under four-power occupation, with the Soviet Union occupying some of her most productive areas, her Government is democratic. No member of the Communist Party is a member of the Government although there are presently five Communists in the parliament. Since eight seats are required to introduce legislation, the Communists are relatively ineffective although they do use their position for the spreading of Soviet propaganda.

With Vienna itself divided for occupation purposes among the four powers, except for the small sector made international, it was to be expected that the visit of the American delegation might be the occasion for some Communist demonstration. Such a demonstration did take place, with the usual evidences of careful organization, but the Austrian police kept the situation under control without difficulty.

As an interesting commentary on Communist press tactics in Vienna, there is reproduced below, first, the press statement released by Senator Green on behalf of the committee, and second, the Com-

munist Party Vienna Daily's article on the visit of the delegation. This is a good example of the extremes of distortion to which the Communists resort.

PRESS STATEMENT BY SENATOR THEODORE FRANCIS GREEN, CHAIRMAN OF UNITED STATES SENATE DELEGATION VISITING AUSTRIA, NOVEMBER 15, 1951

Speaking for my colleagues from both Houses of the Congress of the United States, as well as for myself, I wish to express our deep appreciation for the invitation of the Austrian Government, an invitation which was gladly accepted by our Congress. It is a fine thing for representatives of free governments to meet together and exchange ideas. It is by discussion and debate that free governments reach decisions which are of benefit to their people. During our next few days here in Vienna we will have an opportunity to discuss problems of common interest with your officials and representatives of various groups. We expect to leave here on Sunday, and will proceed to Strasbourg where we will meet with representatives of the Council of Europe for a public discussion of the Union of Europe. This discussion should be of particular interest to the people of Austria because of your deep desire to see a strong, free Europe.

Austria has always occupied a special place in the hearts of Americans. great music, your high culture, have made a profound impression in the United States. We have a special place in our hearts for Vienna, from which come the Strauss waltzes which are loved in every American home.

The United States was not at war with Austria. Today we are doing our utmost to encourage the conclusion of a treaty which will remove foreign troops from Austrian soil, and bring her into full membership in the society of free nations. I hope that every Austrian realizes that the help which the United States has given his country in recent years has been given out of a full heart, and that my country will do all it can to protect the full freedom of Austria.

There follows the text of an article in the Oesterreichische Volkstimme (Communist Party Vienna Daily) of November 16, 1951, in English translation.

ATOM INCENDIARIES AS HONORARY GUESTS AT BALLHAUSPLATZ

The 13 members of the United States Senate and the House of Representatives, invited to Austria by the Figl-Schaerf Government for a "visit of friendship," arrived in Vienna yesterday and were officially received at Ballhausplatz.

The meaning of this "visit of friendship" can be concluded from information supplied yesterday that the United States Secretary of War, Frank Pace, after inspecting the United States forces in Frankfurt and Berlin, would arrive in

Austria tonight.

The gentlemen from America, who were received as the Government's guests at Ballhausplatz yesterday, in no way concealed the purpose of their trip. Their leader, Senator Green, in the very face of the Government, delivered one of the worst and most provocative harangues ever heard even from American Senators and other warmongers. His entire speech was nothing but a provocation against the liberators of Vienna, the Soviet power. And he patronizingly patted on the back the American lackeys in the Austrian Cabinet, expressing his satisfaction that "the Government had justified the trust which America had put in it" and assuring the Government that it might also count on America's cooperation in the future.

The character of this provocative "visit of friendship" at the Ballhausplatz is further emphasized by the fact that among the United States Senators is none other than the chairman of the congressional committee for atom matters, the ill-reputed Senator McMahon.¹ This is the same Senator who, during his visit with Tito in July of this year, was termed by a newspaper the "atom bomb's foster father" and who, on the occasion of an interview on August 28, said literally: "What are we, after all, producing atom bombs for unless to use them

against the Soviet people?"

¹ Senator McMahon did not join the delegation until later when it reached Strasbourg. It is hardly necessary to point out that statements attributed to Senator McMahon were either not made or have been taken completely out of context.

He is the same Senator McMahon who, on September 18, 1951, demanded mass production of atom weapons in the Senate and, on August 2, 1950, stood up "for a considerable enlargement of the already extensive program for atom and hydrogen bombs."

He is the same Senator McMahon who said in March 1951 that there was "no lawful obstacle to prevent the Atlantic Pact Powers from using the atom bomb and that the atom bomb would, no doubt, be used in case a war should break

out in Europe."

Among the United States Senators there was also Senator Alexander Wiley, member of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, whose particular domain is the development of espionage organizations against the Soviet Union and the

Peoples' Democracies.

These are the Government's "honorary guests." These honorary guests are carrying the murderous atom bomb in their baggage. They have revealed to the Austrian people what kind of gifts America is sending us through them and what kind of "friendship" they are bringing to our people. What they are bringing is war and destruction.

The members of the American delegation who visited Vienna were deeply impressed by the courage and democratic character of the leaders of the Austrian Government and the steps which Austria has taken, despite occupation, to rehabilitate her productive enterprises.

During the visit, the Austrian Government tendered a state dinner to the delegation which was held in the room where in 1815 the Congress of Vienna convened. Chancellor Figl at that dinner expressed the "infinite gratitude" of Austria to the United States for the "decisive role" played by the American Army "in the liberation of our people from the Nazi regime." He remarked that after liberation, "when our Nation was in danger of literally dying from hunger, you again helped and saved us and especially our children, who are our future." He spoke of the Marshall plan as "the most generous aid drive in world history" and added:

Our nation owes it to this plan that it has been able to sustain the struggle which has now lasted for $6\frac{1}{2}$ years. It is only natural that the Austrians have become impatient, that they are yearning for liberation, but they will not weaken, they will not give in * * * we are going to keep this Austrian bastion in the center of Europe, as long as it is necessary and as long as we are assisted by the free nations.

Senator Green, speaking on behalf of the American group, responded in German. He said in part (English translation):

Since 1945 Austria has made another vital contribution to the free world. Under the most difficult circumstances, and in the immediate presence of Soviet danger, the people and Government of Austria have struggled relentlessly for the freedom of their country and for the maintenance of democratic institutions. All the world has watched you stand up boldly in the face of a dictatorial power that encroaches on your daily life. That power tries to drain and disrupt your economy. That power continues to deny you the state treaty which Austria has long deserved. Many people in far-away lands have taken heart from the courage you have shown. You have kept the faith—and you may be assured that the free world of which you are a part will continue to show its warm faith in you.

C. VISIT TO ITALY AND NORTH AFRICA

Upon conclusion of the meetings at Strasbourg, several members of the official party proceeded to the Po River Valley in Italy, to Naples, and afterward to North Africa.

Po Valley floods.—The purpose of the visit to the Po River was to obtain first-hand information on the nature and extent of the flood

in that fertile valley and to observe the type of assistance which

American engineering units from Trieste were rendering.

Members who visited the Po Valley included Senators Green, chairman, Wiley, Hickenlooper, Hendrickson, Benton, and Representatives O'Toole, and Keating. This group was able from the air to observe the extent of the floods by a flight over the flooded areas. After landing at Treviso, Senators Green and Wiley and Representatives O'Toole and Keating proceeded by automobile to Rovigo at which point refugees were being debarked, given assistance, and then being sent on to homes prepared to receive them. The assistance given by a small American military group brought over from Trieste consisted for the most part in providing heavy equipment used to strengthen dikes, and also providing boats for the evacuation of flood victims.

The visiting group was impressed with the well-organized way in which the Italian authorities were caring for flood victims. From camps provided to take care of victims as soon as they had reached safety, refugees were immediately moved from the danger areas to homes in the general area whose people doubled up in order to give

haven to their homeless compatriots.

It was not possible at the time of the visit to get a reliable estimate on the extent of the damage or the cost of repairing the ravages of the flood. While rehabilitation and reconstruction will impose a heavy burden on the Italian Government, the willingness of the Economic Cooperation Administration representatives in Italy to agree to the use of counterpart funds for help should be of great assistance.

A disaster of this type calls for outside assistance. It is to be hoped that private organizations in this country with strong ties in Italy

will be able to give the much needed help.

North Africa.—The purpose of the visit to North Africa, which included Tunisia, Algeria, and Tangier, was to consult with American officials in those areas about conditions there and some of the problems the peoples of North Africa face, especially in French Morocco. The group which traveled to North Africa included Senator Green, chairman; Senator Wiley, Representative O'Toole, and Representative Keating.

It would be presumptuous on the basis of the committee's relatively short stay in North Africa to set forth any firm conclusions. However, even during a short visit, the group which visited Africa obtained a series of impressions which might be helpful if summed up as follows:

1. Members of Congress should probably give more attention to the problems that face North Africa because of the tremendous impact which disturbed conditions there could have upon the defense position of the United States.

2. Although the Soviet Union has no consulates in North Africa, the ever increasing nationalism in the Arab world makes that area a fertile ground for those forces in the world which thrive on dis-

content.

3. The fact that American representatives in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco must deal officially with French representatives and therefore have only limited contacts with local nationalist groups makes it difficult for our representatives there to obtain extensive or accurate information on native feeling.

4. It seemed imperative to the group that the Department of State do its utmost to see that American representatives in North Africa are of the best. They must be kept informed of conditions not only there

but also throughout the whole Arab world.

5. In past years many nationalist groups in North Africa have felt that the United States is their best friend. In recent years, however, the United States has found itself in the position of siding more and more often with the colonial powers and against nationalist groups who want greater independence. While the existence of American bases in North Africa makes it difficult for the United States to take positions which might tend to encourage unsettled conditions there, nevertheless, as long as the United States remains the champion of freedom in the world it cannot ignore the natural aspirations for freedom of colonial peoples. In the Near East, as in the Far East, there is a rising tide of nationalism which must be recognized if these areas are to live in lasting peace.

6. Consideration might well be given by Congress to the inclusion in future foreign aid legislation of a statement giving voice to the general sympathy and understanding of Americans for the aspiration of

colonial peoples for freedom.

APPENDIX I. INVITATION OF CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

Resolution $2^{\, \mathrm{1}}$ on Relations Between the Congress of the United States and

THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

The Assembly,

Considering that the free peoples of Europe and of the United States have

many vital problems in common,

Considering that the solidarity between them arises not only from the common dangers they have to face, but is also the reflection of their common origin, and of their community of thought and civilisation,

Taking note that the Committee of Ministers in their Message to the Assembly has declared that it would welcome any initiative of the Assembly designed to

establish links with the Congress of the United States,

Believing that it would be of the greatest interest for public opinion in the democracies if these problems of common interest were to be discussed by delegations from the two Houses of the Congress of the United States and from the Consultative Assembly,

Instructs its Bureau

To approach the Congress of the United States through the Speakers of both Houses for the purpose of arranging for such a discussion to take place in public, preferably in Strasbourg, or, if for any reason circumstances make it desirable, in Washington, at a date mutually convenient, and in accordance with an agenda drawn up in advance by agreement between the officers of the Congress of the United States and the Bureau of the Consultative Assembly.

APPENDIX II. SENATE CONCURRENT RESOLUTION

[Repts. Nos. 889 and 938; 82d Cong., 1st Sess.]

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring), That not to exceed fourteen Members of Congress shall be appointed to meet jointly with the representatives appointed by the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe for public discussion of problems of common interest, as envisioned by the resolution of the Consultative Assembly of May 12, 1951. Of the Members of the Congress to be appointed for the purposes of this resolution, half shall be appointed by the Speaker of the House from Members of the House, and half shall be appointed by the President of the Senate from Members of the Senate. Not more than four of the appointees from the respective Houses shall be of the same political party.

The expenses incurred by Members of the Senate, the House, and by staff members appointed for the purpose of carrying out this concurrent resolution shall not exceed \$15,000 for each House, respectively, and shall be paid from the contingent fund of the House of which they are Members. Payments shall be made upon the submission of vouchers approved by the chairman of the respec-

tive House or Senate delegation.

APPENDIX III. INVITATIONS FROM GERMANY AND AUSTRIA [Translation]

1. GERMAN BUNDESTAG INVITATION

THE PRESIDENT OF THE GERMAN BUNDESTAG,

Bonn, 24 October 1951.

To the Honorable Vice President of the United States of America, President of the Senate, Washington, D. C.

In grateful acknowledgement of the numerous invitations issued to Deputies of the German Bundestag by the United States, the President of the German

¹This Resolution was adopted by the Assembly at its Thirteenth Sitting, 12th May 1951. (See Doc. AS (3) 45, Report of the Committee on General Affairs.)

Bundestag has the honor of communicating to the Vice President of the United States and President of the Senate the wish of the Bundestag to invite a group of members of the Senate of the United States to visit the Federal Republic of Germany from 10 to 15 November 1951.

The President of the German Bundestag would take pleasure in being able to

welcome here the following honorable gentlemen:

Senator Theodore F. Green Senator William Benton Senator Hubert H. Humphrey Senator Brien McMahon Senator Alexander Wiley Senator Bourke B. Hickenlooper Senator Robert C. Hendrickson Representative Eugene Cox Representative Howard Smith Representative Donald O'Toole Representative Frazier Reams Representative Walter Judd Representative Harris Ellsworth Representative Kenneth Keating

While in the Federal Republic, these honorable gentlemen will be the guests of the German Bundestag and will have an opportunity of becoming acquainted with the institutions of German parliamentary life. Opportunity will also be afforded to get in touch with representatives of the Federal Government and certain land governments.

A corresponding letter of invitation covering the same period of time is being tendered to the Speaker of the House of Representatives.

2. Austrian Invitation

OCTOBER 8, 1951.

Hon. Tom Connally, United States Senate.

My Dear Senator Connally: In my letter to you of September 12, 1951, I informed you that the German Parliament had expressed the hope that a group of the Members of the United States Congress would visit Germany as guests of the Federal Republic. In my letter I suggested that if it is decided that certain Members of Congress will be proceeding to Strasbourg in November to meet with representatives of the Council of Europe, consideration might be given to those Members of Congress visiting Germany as guests of the Federal Republic either before or after the Strasbourg meeting.

I have just received a telegram from our Ambassador to Austria, Walter Donnelly, transmitting the text of a letter from the Austrian Foreign Minister, Dr. Karl Gruber, addressed to the Secretary regarding the possibility of a visit to Austria by a group of Members of Congress. The text of Foreign Minister

Gruber's letter is as follows:

"Dear Mr. Secretary: Since the end of the war the Austrian Government has had the pleasure of meeting many of the Members of the United States Congress who visited this country for the purpose of studying the postwar problems of this area. We feel that the mutual understanding that has arisen from such visits has been most important and beneficial for the purposes of our respective governments. I have been informed of the possibility of a delegation of Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives attending as observers the Consultative Assembly of Europe at Strasbourg in November. We should feel greatly honored, dear Mr. Secretary, if this group might also visit Austria, for which I should like to extend a cordial invitation on behalf of the Austrian Government at this time.

"Sincerely yours,

"(Signed) GRUBER."

In the case of the recent trips of members of the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees to Europe, it was not feasible for either party to visit Austria because of the shortage of available time. I believe, therefore, that it would be extremely helpful in our relations with Austria, as well as beneficial to Members of Congress, if the invitation from the Foreign Minister to visit that country could be accepted. Should it be decided that certain Members of Congress will be going to Strasbourg and to Germany, it might be possible for the group to consider a visit to Austria at the same time.

Sincerely yours,

JACK F. McFall, Assistant Secretary of State.

APPENDIX IV. ITINERARY

DETAILED ITINERARY OF SPECIAL JOINT CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE TO MEET WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

(Time is local time)

PARIS

November 9, Friday:

3 p. m.: First meeting of American Delegation.

3:30 p. m.: Briefing at American Embassy by Ambassador Bruce and staff. 6 p. m.: Reception by Ambassador Bruce.

November 10, Saturday:

10:30 a.m.: Departure for Wahn Airport, Bonn, Germany.

BONN

November 10, Saturday:

12 noon: Arrived Wahn Airport and brief reception by German parliamentary officials.

1:30 p.m.: Lunch at Hotel Excelsior, Cologne. Host: Dr. Schwering, Lord Mayor of Cologne.

7:30 p. m.: Reception at Bad Godesberg. Host: The United States High Commissioner, John J. McCloy.

November 11, Sunday:

10:30 a.m.; Visit to Brühl Castle. Guide: Count Franz Metternich.
1 p.m.: Lunch in Düsseldorf, "Rheinclub." Host: Karl Arnold, Minister President of the Land Northrhine-Westphalia and representatives of German industry and Germany Trade-Unions.

8 p. m.: Reception in the Houses of Parliament. Host: Dr. Hermann Ehlers, President of the German Hundestag. The United States guests met the Vice Presidents of the German Bundestag, the parliamentary group leaders, the chairmen of Committees as well as other deputies.

November 12, Monday:

10 a. m.: Reception in the House of the Federal President. Host: The Federal President.

1 p. m.: Lunch. Host: Franz Blücher, Vice Chancellor and Federal Minister for European Recovery Program matters.

3:30 p.m.: Discussions in the Federal Chancellery and short speeches by Staatssekretär Professor Dr. Hallstein; by Hermann J. Abs, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Kreditanstalt fur Wideraufbau; as well as by the Federal Minister for Refugee Matters.

8 p. m.: Dinner in the Federal Chancellery. Host: The Federal Chancellor, Dr. Konrad Adenauer. The United States guests met the Presidents and Vice Presidents of the German Bundestag and Bundesrat, the United States High Commissioner John McCloy and his staff, as well as the Members of the Federal Government.

November 13, Tuesday:

10 a. m.: Attendance at a Meeting of the Committee on the Occupation

Statute and Foreign Affairs.

1 p. m.: Lunch in the House of Parliament. Host: The German Group of the Parliamentarian Union. The United States guests met the chairmen of the Committees of the German Bundestag.

3 p. m.: Attendance at a Meeting of the Committee of Refugee Matters.

6 p. m.: Some members met with Moral Rearmament Group. 7:30 p. m.: Dinner in the Hotel "Bergischer Hof". Host: Dr. Karl Georg Pfleiderer, Chairman of the Parliamentarian Union.

9:30 p.m.: Reception in the rooms of the German Parliamentarian Union. Host: The Presidents of the German Parliamentarian Union.

November 14, Wednesday:

9:30 a.m.: Attendance at a meeting of the Committee for European Recovery Program matters.

11:30 a.m.: Press Conference. Chairman: Dr. Fritz Brühl, President of the Federal Press Conference.

12:30 p.m.: Lunch at Hotel Dreesen, Bad Godesberg. Host: Heinrich Kopf, President of the German Bundesrat. The U.S. guests met the Premiers of the Land Governments of the Federal Republic of Germany.

2:30 p.m.: Attendance at a Plenary Meeting of the German Bundestag with remarks by the Bundestag President and Senator Green.

4 p. m.: Departure from Wahn Airport to Munich.

MUNICH

7:30 p. m.: Arrival in Munich, Tullin Airport. Hotel "Bayrischer Hof". 9:30 p. m.: Reception by the Bavarian State Government. November 15, Thursday:

9 a. m.: Visit to Radio Station Free Europe. 12:30 p.m.: Depart from Munich for Vienna.

2:30 p. m.: Arrive Vienna, Bristol Hotel.

3:30 p. m.: Briefing by Ambassador Donnelly and staff.

5:30 p. m.: Call on Chancellor Figl, Vice Chancellor Schaerf, and Foreign Minister Gruber.

8:30 p.m.: Official State Dinner. November 16, Friday:

9:30 a.m.: Call on President Koerner.

10 a.m.: Visit to Austrian Parliament.

1 p. m.: Lunch with Foreign Minister Gruber and Austrian Officials.

November 17, Saturday:
1 p. m.: Lunch at Kahlenberg with Foreign Minister Gruber and Austrian Parliament group.

6 p. m.: Reception by Ambassador Donnelly. 8:30 p.m.: Reception by Chancellor Figl.

November 18, Sunday:

2 p. m.: Depart for Strasbourg.

STRASBOURG

3:40 p.m.: Arrive Strasbourg, Hotel Maison Rouge. 7 p. m.: Reception by American Consul General Andrews.

November 19, Monday:

12 Noon: Procedural meeting between President Spaak of the Consultative Assembly, Senator Green, and Representative Cox. 2:45 p.m.: Meeting of American Delegation. 3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m.: First Formal Session with Delegation from the

Consultative Assembly.

8:30 p. m.: Dinner given by M. Spaak. November 20, Tuesday:

9:45 a.m.: Meeting of American Delegation

10:30 a.m. to 12:30 p.m.: Second Formal Session. 1 p. m.: Luncheon by Prefect Monsieur Paul Demange. 3 p. m. to 5:55 p. m.: Third Formal Session.

6:30 p.m. Reception by Assistant Secretary General of the Council of Europe M. Caracciolo.

8:30 p.m.: Dinner by Mr. Caracciolo. 10 p.m.: Reception by French-American Committee.

November 21, Wednesday:

9:30 a.m.: Meeting of American Delegation.

10:15 a. m. to 12:20 p. m.: Fourth Formal Session. 3:10 p. m. to 6:10 p. m.: Fifth Formal Session.

7 p. m.: Reception and Dinner by Secretary General of the Council of Europe. M. Paris.

November 22, Thursday:

9:30 a.m.: Meeting of American Delegation. 10 a. m. to 12:52 p. m.: Sixth Formal Session.

1 p. m.: Press Conference by American Delegation. 2:30 to 6:25 p. m.: Seventh Formal Session.

6:30 p. m.: Reception given by American Delegation.

November 23, Friday:

9:15 a.m.: Meeting of American Delegation, 10 a. m. to 1 p. m.: Eighth Formal Session.

3 p. m. to 7: 15 p. m.: Ninth and Final Formal Session.

November 24, Saturday:

9:45 a. m.: Depart Strasbourg for Treviso, Italy.

2:25 p. m.: Arrive Treviso, Italy (For inspection of flood damage). 3 p. m.: Briefing by American Air Force Officers on search being made for C-47 believed lost on flight to Belgrade. (This was plane forced to land in Hungary.)

3:30 p. m.: Departure for on-the-spot inspection of flooded areas near

Rovigo.

7:30 p. m.: Arrive Venice. November 25, Sunday:

6 p. m.: Press Conference.

7 p. m.: Reception by American Consul Pitts.

8:30 p. m.: Dinner by Mayor and Prefect of Venice, and President of Provincial Council.

November 26, Monday.

7:30 a.m.: Depart Venice for Treviso. 10:15 a.m.: Depart Treviso for Rome.

12:05 p. m.: Arrive Rome. 12:50 p.m.: Depart for Naples. 1:35 p.m.: Arrive Naples.

November 27, Tuesday:

7 p. m.: Reception and briefing by United States Consul General Nestor.

November 28, Wednesday: 7 a. m.: Depart for Tunis.

12:15 p. m.: Arrive Tunis, Majestic Hotel.

1 p. m.: Lunch with United States Consul General Jernegan. 2:45 p. m.: Call on M. de Boisseson, the French Minister-Delegate.
3:30 p. m.: Visit to American Military Cemetery at Carthage.
5:30 p. m.: Briefing on local situation by Consul General Jernegan and staff.

7:30 p. m.: Dinner with Consul General and staff. November 29, Thursday:

9:50 a.m.: Depart for Algiers.

ALGIERS

12:15 p. m.: Arrive Algiers, Hotel St. George. 12:45 p.m.: Call on French Governor-General.

7 p. m.: Dinner with United States Consul General Lockett and briefing by Consul General and staff.

November 30, Friday:

10 a. m.: Depart Algiers.

TANGIER

1 p. m.: Arrive Tangier, El Minzah Hotel. 3:30 p. m.: Briefing by Mr. William H. Beach, Deputy Chief of Mission, by Mission staff, and by United States officials from Casablanca. 7 p. m.: Reception at Legation to meet foreign officials.

December 1, Saturday:

10 a. m.: Depart Tangier.

LISBON

11:50 a.m.: Arrive Lisbon, Hotel Palacio. 1 p. m.: Lunch with Ambassador MacVeigh.

4:30 p. m.: Briefing by Ambassador MacVeigh and United States Military and ECA officials.

6 p. m.: Reception by Ambassador to meet Portuguese officials.

December 2, Sunday:

5 p. m.: Reception by Mr. Minotto, Chief of ECA Mission.

6 p. m.: Discussions with Portuguese officials on colonial problems.

8:30 p.m.: Dinner by American Ambassador for Delegation and Portuguese officials and businessmen.

December 3, Monday:

11 a. m.: Departure for Portuguese Air Force Base.

12 Noon: Inspection of Air base. 1:30 p.m.: Lunch with Portuguese Air Force Officers.

6:30 p. m.: Reception by General Camm, head of United States Military Advisory Group.

8:30 p.m.: Call on Dr. Salazar, Prime Minister.

December 4, Tuesday:

9:50 a.m.: Depart for Paris.

PARTS

3:05 p. m.: Arrive Paris, Orly Field, where Delegation disbanded.

APPENDIX V. MINUTES OF PRELIMINARY MEETING IN WASHINGTON, D. C., SEPTEMBER 13, 1951

MINUTES OF THE MEETING HELD IN THE CAPITOL, WASHINGTON, D. C., ON THURS-DAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 1951, BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE, FOR THE PURPOSE OF ARRANGING A MEETING BETWEEN A DELEGATION FROM UNITED STATES CONGRESS AND A DELEGATION FROM THE CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE

There were present:

For the United States Senate: Senators Gillette, Fulbright, and McMahon. For the United States House of Representatives: Representatives Battle,

Javits, and Judd. For the Consultative Assembly: M. P.-H. Spaak, President; Lord Layton, Vice

Also present: Messrs. Crawford (Foreign Affairs Committee of the United States House of Representatives) and Marcy (Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate).

Messrs. J. C. Paris (Secretary-General, Council of Europe) and Dunstan Curtis, counselor, Assembly Services.

Senator Gillette in the chair.

1. The agenda was submitted to the meeting and agreed to.

2. Place of proposed meeting.—It was agreed that the proposed meeting should take place in Strasbourg in the House of Europe.

3. Date of proposed meeting.—It was agreed that the meeting should take

place during the week commencing November 19, 1951.

4. Duration of proposed meeting.—It was agreed that the meeting should last for not less than 4 days nor more than 7 days, the final decision in this connection to be taken hereafter.

5. Agenda of proposed meeting.—It was agreed that the agenda should be limited to one item, of which the title should be "The Union of Europe; Its

Progress, Problems, and Prospects, and Its Place in the Western World."
6. Administrative arrangements—(1) Working papers.—It was agreed that the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe would prepare a working paper to serve as the basis for discussion at the proposed meeting. This paper would take the form of a factual statement on the general questions raised in the agenda from the point of view of the Council of Europe, and would be communicated to the members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee in sufficient time to enable the latter to prepare a corresponding document setting forth the American point of view with regard to the questions raised.

(2) Language.—It was agreed that the official languages in use at the proposed meeting should be English and French, with simul-aneous interpretation from

one to the other.

(3) Proceedings.—It was agreed that the proceedings should take the form of a general discussion rather than of an exchange of set speeches.

(4) Chairmanship.—It was agreed that the Chair should be taken alternate days by a member of the Congress delegation and by a member of the Assembly delegation, the Chair being taken on the opening day by a member of the Assembly delegation.

(5) Records.—It was agreed that minutes and a verbatim record should be

kept of the proceedings.

(6) Publicity.—It was agreed that the meetings should take place in public or in private according to the decision of the members present, having regard to the subjects under discussion: and that every effort should be made to obtain the maximum publicity possible for the proceedings.

The meeting was adjourned sine die.

APPENDIX VI. BIOGRAPHIES OF DELEGATES

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES OF EUROPEAN REPRESENTATIVES ATTENDING THE MEETING WITH THE DELEGATION FROM THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

A. EX OFFICIO MEMBERS

1. Paul-Henri Spaak: Socialist; Member of Belgian Parliament; born in Schaerbeek on January 25, 1899; lawyer at the Brussels Court of Appeals; Minister of Transport, Posts, Telegraph, Telephone, 1935–36; Minister for Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade, 1936–38; Prime Minister, 1938–39; 1940–45 member of the Belgian Government in London; Minister for Foreign Affairs, 1946–49; Prime Minister, 1947–49; President of the First General Assembly of the United Nations 1946; Chairman of the OEEC Council, 1948-49; President of the International Council of the European Movement; Belgian representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1949; President of the Consultative Assembly 1949-50, 1950-51, 1951-52.

2. Heinrich von Brentano: Christian-Democrat; Deputy of the Bundestag; born in Offenbach (Main) on January 20, 1904; lawyer at the Darmstadt Court of Appeals; cofounder of the Christian Democratic Union in Hesse, 1945; elected to the Bundestag 1949; president of the parliamentary group of the Christian Democratic Union since 1949; German representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1950; Vice President of the Consultative Assembly, 1950-51,

1951-52.

3. Stefano Jacini: Christian-Democrat; Senator; born in Milan on November 3, 1886; lawyer; deputy of the Italian Popular Party during the twenty-fifth, twenty-sixth, and twenty-seventh legislatures, deprived of his mandate by the Fascist government; emigrated to Switzerland; member of the first committee of national liberation in Milan, 1945; Minister of War, 1945; elected Deputy for Milan to the Constituent Assembly 1946; Italian representative on the Executive Committee of UNESCO; Italian representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1949; Vice President of the Consultative Assembly 1949-50,

1950-51, 1951-52.

4. Lord Layton: Liberal; Member of the House of Lords; born in London on March 15, 1884; chairman of the Economist; vice chairman of the Daily News; a director of Reuters; university lecturer in economics, 1912; member of the Allied Forces Munitions Board, of the Milner mission to Russia and of the Balfour mission to the United States 1914–18; Director of the Financial and Economic Section of the League of Nations; director of the National Federation of Iron and Steel Manufacturers; British delegate to World Economic Conference, 1927; British member of Organization Committee of Bank of International Settlements, 1929; editor of the Economist, 1922–38; Director General of Programs, Minister of Supply 1940-42; chairman of the executive committee, Ministry of Supply 1941-42; chief adviser on programs and planning, Ministry of Production 1942-43; head of Joint War Production Staff, 1942-43; chairman of the United Kingdom National Council of the European Movement, and Vice Chairman of the International Executive Committee of the European Movement; British representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1949; Vice President of the Consultative Assembly, 1949-50, 1950-51, 1951-52.

5. François de Menthon: Republican Popular Movement (MRP); Deputy

of the French National Assembly; born in Montmirey (Jura) on January 8, 1900; chairman of the Catholic Association of the French Youth 1923-30; appointed professor of political economy at University of Nancy, 1930; founder

of a resistance movement Liberty in Lyons, 1940; joined General de Gaulle in Algiers in 1943; Commissioner for Justice in the Committee of National Liberation at Algiers, 1943-44; Minister of Justice in the First Provisional Government, 1944-45; elected to the Constituent Assembly 1945; reelected to the National Assembly 1946; Minister of National Economy, 1946; reelected to the National Assembly 1951; chairman of the parliamentary group of the Republican Popular Movement; French representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1949; Vice President of the Consultative Assembly 1949–50, 1950–51 1951-52.

6. Finn Moe: Labor-Deputy of the Norwegian Storting; born in Bergen on October 12, 1902; journalist; director of Norwegian Broadcasting Services, New York, 1941-43; consultant, Norwegian Foreign Ministry in London, 1941-43; adviser to Secretary-General, United Nations 1946; Norwegian delegate to several United Nations General Assemblies; elected Deputy 1949; chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Storting since 1949; Chairman of the Political Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations 1951; Norwegian representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1950; Vice President

of the Consultative Assembly 1951-52.

7. Suad Hayri ÜRGÜPLÜ: Independent; Deputy of the Turkish National Assembly; born on July 30, 1903; commercial court judge, 1929-32; lawyer at Istanbul, 1932-50; elected to the Turkish National Assembly 1949; Minister for Customs and Monopolies, 1943-50; reelected Deputy in 1950; member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly; Turkish representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1950; Vice President of the Consultative Assembly 1950-51, 1951-52.

B. BENELUX

1. Etienne de la Vallee Poussin: Social-Christian Party; Senator; born in Brussels on November 23, 1903; elected Senator 1946; chairman of the Belgian Council of the European Movement; Belgian representative to the Consultative

Assembly since 1949.

2. Jan van de Kieft: Socialist; Deputy of the First Chamber of the Dutch States General; born in Amsterdam on May 21, 1884; businessman publisher, municipal councilor of Bussum 1930; member of the executive committee of the Socialist Party since 1930; elected Deputy in 1940; Dutch representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1949.

C. FRANCE

1. Guy Mollet: Socialist; Deputy of the French National Assembly; born in Flers on December 31, 1905; professor of literature in Arras until 1932; participated in the resistence movement 1942-45; mayor of Arras after the liberaticipated in the resistence movement 1942-45, mayor of Arras after the motion; president of the General Council of Pas-de-Calais; elected to the Constituent Assembly 1945; reelected to the National Assembly, 1946; Secretary-General of the French Socialist Party (SFIO) since 1946; Minister of State for the Council of Europe 1950; former Vice President of the Council of Ministers 1951; reelected to the National Assembly 1951; French representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1949; chairman of the Committee on General Affairs

1951-52.

2. Paul Reynaud: Independent-Republican; Deputy of the French National Assembly; born on October 15, 1878, at Barcelonette (Basses-Alpes); advocate at the Court of Appeals in Paris before the First World War; Elected Deputy 1928; Minister of Finance, 1930; Minister for the Colonies, 1931-32; Minister of Justice, 1932 and 1935-38; Minister of Finance 1938-40; Prime Minister, Minister for Foreign Aflairs, and Minister for War and National Defense in three Cabinets 1940; imprisoned by the Vichy Government in 1940, condemned to detention in 1941, transferred to Germany in 1943; elected Deputy to the Constituent Assembly 1946; reelected to the National Assembly 1946; Minister of Finance and Economic Affairs 1948; reelected, 1951; French representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1949; Chairman of the Committee on Economic Questions 1949-50, 1950-51, 1951-52.

D. GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

1. Gerstenmaier, Eugen: Christian Democrat: Deputy of the Bundestag; born in Kirchheim (Würtemberg) on August 23, 1906; lecturer at the University of Berlin from 1935 until dismissed by the National Socialist Government in 1937; in 1939 put in charge of international relations in the central office of the German Protestant Church; arrested and sentenced to 7 years hard labor for participation in the conspiracy of July 20, 1944; founder and chairman of the Protestant Mutual Aid Movement 1945; member of the World Council of Churches; elected to the Bundestag 1949; vice president of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Bundestag; German representative to the Consultative As-

sembly since 1950.

2. Schmid, Carlo: Social Democrat; Deputy of the Bundestag; born in Perpignan (France) on December 3, 1896; lawyer 1924; judge 1925; lecturer at the University of Tübingen 1929; Secretary of State for Justice in the Land-Government of Würtemberg-Hohenzollern 1947-50; member of the executive committee of the German Social Democratic Party since 1947; elected to the Bundestag 1949; First Vice President of the Bundestag; president of the Foreign Affairs Commission; vice president of the European Union, of the German Council of the Europe Movement, and of the international parliamentary group of this movement; German representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1950.

E. GREECE

Stamatios Mercouris: Progressive Party; Deputy of the Greek Parliament; born on June 2, 1897; elected Deputy in 1920, 1926, 1935, 1936, 1950; Minister of Information, 1935; Minister of Police and Public Works, 1945–46; Greek representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1950.

F. IRELAND

James Crosbie: Fine Gael; Senator; born in Cork on August 27, 1902; called to the Irish bar 1925; practiced on Munster circuit; publisher; organized and led a Catholic relief unit to work among the displaced persons in Germany after 1945; elected to the Irish Senate in 1938 and reelected at each subsequent election; Irish representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1949.

G. ITALY

1. Ferruccio Parri: Republican; Senator; born in 1890; journalist; several times arrested and imprisoned for anti-Fascist activities 1926–42; leading organizer of the Volunteer Corps of the Liberation after 1943; first Prime Minister of reunited Italy after the liberation of the north of the country 1945; cofounder of the Republican Democratic Party in 1946 which afterward merged with the Republican Party; elected Deputy to the Constituent Assembly 1946; nominated Senator 1947: Italian representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1949.

2. Paolo Treves: Socialist; Deputy of the Chamber of Deputies; born in Milan on July 27, 1908; journalist, author; arrested and imprisoned for anti-Fascist activities 1929, 1935; emigrated to London 1938; broadcaster in the BBC Italian Service 1940–45; served in the Italian Embassy, Paris, 1945–46; elected Deputy for Milan to the Constituent Assembly 1946; reelected to the Chamber

1948; Italian representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1949.

H. SCANDINAVIA

Bertel Gotthard Ohlin: Liberal; member of the Second Chamber of the Swedish Riksdag; born in Klippan on April 23, 1899; professor of political economy at the University of Copenhagen 1924–29; professor at Stockholm University since 1929; elected Senator 1938; Minister of Commerce 1944; elected Deputy 1945; Swedish representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1949.

I. UNITED KINGDOM

1. Robert Boothby: Conservative; Member of Parliament; born 1900; elected to the House of Commons in 1924 and reelected ever since; parliamentary private secretary to the Chancelor of the Exchequer (Winston Churchill) 1926-29; parliamentary secretary, Ministry of Food 1940-41; vice president of the Parliamentary Group of the British National Council of the European Movement and member of the International Bureau; British representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1949.

2. Glenvil Hall: Labour; Member of Parliament; born in Almeley, Herefordshire on April 4, 1887; barrister at law; a Member of the House of Commons

1929-31; parliamentary private secretary to the Financial Secretary to the Treasury 1929-31; reelected to the House of Commons 1939 and ever since; British delegate to the United Nations General Assembly 1945, 1946, 1948, and to the Paris Peace Conference 1946; Financial Secretary to the Treasury 1945-50; chairman, Parliamentary Group, Labour Party since 1950; British representative to the Consultative Assembly since 1950.

APPENDIX VII. RESOLUTIONS ADOPTED BY CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY AT NOVEMBER-DECEMBER 1951 MEETING

RECOMMENDATION 8 ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A EUROPEAN AUTHORITY FOR AGRICULTURE 1

The Assembly.

Having taken note of the Report submitted by the Special Committee on Agri-

culture and approving the principle contained therein,

Approving the initiative taken by the French Government in convening a Conference for the purpose of considering the creation of some form of joint organisation of the principal European agricultural markets,

Recommends to the Committee on Ministers

(a) that a conference of experts be convened as early as possible, within the framework of the Council of Europe, for the purpose of preparing a draft Treaty instituting a European Agricultural Authority on the basis of principles contained in the afore-mentioned Report,

(b) that member countries of O. E. E. C. which are not Members of the

Council of Europe shall be invited to take part in the Conference,

(c) that representatives of the producers be associated with the governmental

(d) that, in connection with the work of the conference, close liaison shall be maintained with the various competent international organisations and that the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe shall be kept regularly informed of the progress achieved.

RECOMMENDATION 9 FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A POSTAL UNION BETWEEN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 2

The Assembly.

Noting that, in the course of its examination of the question of the European Postage Stamp, the Committee on Economic Questions emphasized the importance of considering a reduction in postal charges as between the Members

of the Council of Europe.

Recognizing that, apart from the considerable psychological effect which might be expected, the reduction of charges to the lowest possible figure, the speedy conveyance of mail by the widespread use of air transport free from surtax, the improvement of the postal and telecommunication services and the introduction of new facilities for users, would be measures of incalculable value to intra-European trade, Having noted that a Postal Union with an internal scale of charges exists

already between two Member States of the Council, viz, France and Italy

1. Invites the Secretariat General to pursue without delay its examination of the problem as a whole, with the aim of assembling the fullest possible documentation on the subject and of combining the results in the form of a memorandum.

2. Recommends that the Committee of Ministers:

(a) Should take all possible measures to bring about the prompt establishment of a Postal Union between all the Member States identical with that already in existence between France and Italy:

¹This Recommendation was adopted by the Assembly at its Twenty-Eighth Sitting, 1st December 1951. (See Doc. 4 and addendum, Report of the Special Committee for Agriculture).

This Recommendation was adopted by the Assembly at its Thirty-second Sitting, 5th December 1951 (see Doc. 54, Report of the Committee on Economic Questions).

(b) Should extend to telephonic communications the facilities envisaged with regard to postal communications, account being taken only of distances and

not of the frontiers separating the various countries:

(c) Should call for a Conference of European Postal and Telecommunication Services with instructions to achieve the above aims on the basis of the preparatory work done by the Secretariat General.

RECOMMENDATION 10 ON A COMMON POLICY ON FULL EMPLOYMENT

The Assembly. Recalling the terms of its Recommendation 25 (2nd Session 1950: Doc. 103) of August 1950, requesting each Member State to be invited to submit to it a "full employment target" and certain other information concerning its domestic policy for achieving full employment and economic stability,

Noting that the Committee of Ministers transmitted this Recommendation to Member States with the request that the replies should reach the Secretariat General before 1st February, 1951.

Wishing to draw the attention of the Committee of Ministers to the fact that by May, 1951 only nine Governments had forwarded their replies and that at the beginning of November two Governments had still not complied with the

Furthermore noting that only one Government, namely that of the United Kingdom, had fixed a full employment target and that several replies lacked the data necessary for assessing the economic situation in the respective countries and the general character of their domestic policies,

Referring to the replies furnished by the Member States on their employment

situation 2 and to the conclusions based on the study of these replies.3

Wishing to stress the following aspects of the employment situation in the Member States of the Council of Europe:

(a) That the main problem of most Member States is excessive pressure of demand and that unemployment in Western Europe is mainly concentrated in Germany, Greece, Italy and Turkey,

(b) That in the case of Greece and Turkey the unemployed cannot be integrated in the national economy owing to lack of industrial potential and that in these cases the appropriate remedy is to be found in a policy of industrialisation and emigration at the same time as agricultural development. It should in fact be emphasised that the problem of full employment and of the industrialin fact be emphasised that the problem of run emphayment and of the industrial-isation of the underdeveloped countries of the Council of Europe is intimately linked to the agricultural situation in these countries. Their economic develop-ment raises in fact a twofold problem: first, that of finding opportunities for new employment (in the country itself, in the territory of Member States or in their overseas dependencies) for persons deprived of their liveliheod through the mechanisation and modernisation of agriculture, which in turn calls for the investment of fresh capital in the extractive and manufacturing industries of the home and overseas territories in question; secondly, that of finding reliable export markets for such surplus agricultural output as may arise from the mechanisation of farm production,

(c) That in Germany the unemployment, which is to a certain extent matched by idle industrial capacity, is the result of several factors, such as the continuous influx of refugees, lack of housing in areas where industrial capacity

is not fully utilised, and the political division of Germany.

(d) That in Italy, where again a section of the industrial potential is inadequately used, the problem of unemployment is aggravated by the rapid growth of population and the fact that Southern Italy can to some extent be regarded as an underdeveloped region,

(e) That on the international level a better international allocation of raw materials and concerted measures for facilitating increased mobility of labour and capital would greatly contribute to solving the present problems of unemployment and of inflation in Western Europe,

¹This Recommendation was adopted by the Assembly at its Thirty-second Sitting, 5th December 1951 (see Doc. 65, Third Report of the Committee on Economic Questions).

² See 3rd Session, 1951: Doc. 65, Memorandum appended to the Report.
² See 3rd Session, 1951: Doc. 65 (Explanatory Memorandum).

(f) That there is, however, an even greater need for each Member State to pursue effective and imaginative domestic policies, and that it is a fundamental responsibility of each Government to maintain a high and stable level of em-

ployment while at the same time avoiding inflationary pressure,

Emphasising the importance which it attaches to its Recommendation 5 of May 1951 calling for the convocation, jointly by the Council of Europe and the O. E. E. C., of a Conference to draw up a European agreement on Full Employment and Economic Stability, based on the findings embodied in the Report entitled "Full Employment Objectives and the Problem of European Economic Co-operation" which, by decision of the Committee of Ministers, has been transmitted for comment to the Governments of all Member States,

1. Reiterates its request that each Member State should submit a "full employ-

ment target".

2. Recommends to the Committee of Ministers

(a) That each Member State should re-examine its present economic policy

in the light of the above considerations.

(b) That each Member State should as soon as possible take action on the Recommendation 7 adopted by the Consulatative Assembly on 15th May 1951 concerning the establishment of a Raw Materials Resources and Purchasing Board,

(c) That each Member State should agree to transmit to the Secretariat-

General

(i) twice a year in February and in August the latest available data on the state of employment and prices in Member States and any other documents, such as national income accounts and papers on economic policy, which might be useful in assessing their economic situation.

(ii) a copy of their replies to the various questionnaires sent out by the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations on the economic situation

of Member States.

3. Instructs the Secretariat General to undertake an analysis of these data in collaboration with the other International Organisations concerned as well as with independent experts and to report its findings to the Committee on Economic Questions.

RECOMMENDATION 11 ON A COMMON POLICY OF LOWERING TARIFF BARRIERS IN EUROPE 1

The Assembly,

Considering that Member States should make one of their objectives the removal of barriers to mutual trade, but that any action limited merely to the abolition of quantitative restrictions is insufficient, the more so if it affects only private, to the exclusion of Government, trading,

Noting the particular importance of a common policy by Member States to

lower tariff walls within Europe,

Noting that the first aim of such a policy should be to fix a maximum rate of duties and subsequently to lower by stages customs duties on the greater part of intra-European trade,

1. Proposes that such a policy should be based on the following three Principles: (a) The High Contracting Parties shall undertake by Convention not to retain as between each other any customs duties exceeding 35% beyond a date to be fixed in the Convention and in any case not later than the date of completion of the successive stages of this plan.

In order to facilitate the application of this principle by the High Contracting Parties, States which have high customs duties of a fiscal nature shall be permitted within the above-mentioned period to convert such duties into taxes

imposed equally on imported and internally produced commodities.

(b) The High Contracting Parties shall undertake not to retain or impose on goods originating from other High Contracting Parties any import duties exceeding 5% in respect of raw materials, 15% in respect of semifinished goods, and 25% in respect of finished goods and food products.

The provisions of the second paragraph of the First Principle concerning the possible conversion of certain customs duties into taxes applying equally to

¹This Recommendation was adopted by the Assembly at its Thirty-Third Sitting, 6th December 1951. (See Doc. 62, Report of the Committee on Economic Questions.)

foreign and to home-produced goods shall apply also to the provisions of the

foregoing paragraph.

During the first year the undertaking laid down in the first paragraph of this Principle shall apply only to 70% of the total import trade of each country in any of the categories specified above. During the second year it shall be extended to 80% and during the third year to 90%. The High Contracting Parties shall undertake before the end of the third year to determine the procedure and lay down the conditions in which the above ceilings in respect of import duties may be extended to their minimum tariff schedules.

The High Contracting Parties shall undertake to open negotiations for the purpose of fixing tariff ceilings for individual goods of particular importance

in intra-European trade.

(c) The Convention shall be open to all countries and independent customs

areas willing to accept the obligations therein laid down.

Realising, however, that the adoption of these three Principles would represent only a step towards the achievement of a European Customs Union, the Assembly 2. Recommends the insertion, either in the Convention to be signed by the High Contracting Parties, or in the Final Act of the Conference at which such provisions were accepted, of a clause whereby the States would undertake within

a reasonable period to convene a Conference for the purpose of examining a plan for the complete abolition of customs duties between the countries concerned, 3. Condemns the use of quantitative restrictions as a protective device and declares that they must never neutralise or reduce the effects of the lowering of

duties envisaged in the above paragraphs,

4. Instructs the Secretariat General to keep in touch with the leading official organisations concerned with these problems and especially to study in cooperation with GATT the technical problems arising from the application of the above three Principles, with the final object of drawing up a more detailed plan for the implementation of a "Low Tariff Club" which should take account of the difficulties of the individual States and to study the problem of computing index numbers to measure the height of the average tariffs maintained by each Member State.

5. Instructs the Committee on Economic Questions and the Secretariat General to study, in collaboration with the qualified international bodies, the possible effects of this reform in the different countries, upon the utilisation of manpower and its possible transference from one employment to another.

6. Instructs the Secretariat General so far as possible to associate itself with the work of the special committee which was set up in Geneva in October 1951 and has been given the task of studying suggestions submitted for the lowering of customs duties on a regional basis and of examining the plan drawn up by the French Minister, M. Pflimlin, and

7. Recommends that the Committee of Ministers acquaint Governments with the proposals herein contained and requests them to formulate suggestions whether for an international conference or joint action within the framework of the General Agreement or for other appropriate means to ensure their

implementation.

8. And further recommends that the Committee of Ministers invite the Governments of Member States to report any modifications in their tariffs to the Secretariat General which shall be responsible for their publication.

RECOMMENDATION 12 FOR THE SETTING UP OF AN ASSOCIATION OF EUROPEAN AIR LINE COMPANIES

The Assembly,

Having regard to Recommendation 7 on the Coordination of European Communications adopted on 26th August 1950,

Having considered the position of the various European methods of transport and recognising the desirability of coordinating them by means of establishing

a European Transport Authority,

1. Is of the opinion that, having regard to the conditions in which the various European air lines at present operate, the coordination of air transport is particularly desirable,

¹This Recommendation was adopted by the Assembly at its Thirty-fourth Sitting, 7th December 1951. (See Doc. 59, Report of the Committee on Economic Questions.)

2. Recommends that a conference of governmental experts and of representatives of the various European air companies be immediately convened in order—

(a) to examine the possibility of setting up, under conditions to be laid down and approved, an association of Air Line Companies to take charge of air communications between Member States, or

(b) to report on other possible methods of achieving closer collaboration in order to secure the economic and efficient operation of European Air transport.

RECOMMENDATION 13 ON THE PROBLEMS OF REFUGEES AND OVERPOPULATION 1

The Assembly,

Having taken due note of the Report by the Committee of Experts on the problem of refugees and overpopulation, and expressing its complete agreement with the spirit and conclusions of that Report,

Considering furthermore that it is essential to coordinate and strengthen European action for the solution of the problem of refugees and overpopulation,

1. Recommends to the Committee of Ministers the establishment of a Special Liaison Committee whose members shall be appointed by the Joint Committee of the Council of Europe and shall consist of three members from the Committee of Ministers and three from the Committee on Population and Refugees, the latter to be selected from a list of six of its members to be submitted by that Committee, Committee of the Comm

(a) This Special Liaison Committee, having regard to the work of the Com-

mittee on Population and Refugees, shall be responsible for-

(i) defining, in regard to refugees and overpopulation, the objectives of a common European policy, and for coordinating the work of the Council of Europe in this field;

(ii) laying down the general principles of a policy for the resettlement of

refugees and unemployed persons;

(iii) promoting on an international scale, by means of joint action to be taken by the countries of emigration and of immigration, the application of measures calculated to provide a practical solution to the problem of refugees and overpopulation; and

(iv) enlightening public opinion and collecting the information necessary to enable the Parliaments and Governments of Member States to take the

specific measures which may be required.

(b) To this end, the Special Liaison Committee— (i) shall study practical measures, based on the general principles referred to in subparagraph (ii) of paragraph (a) above, for resettlement and reestablishment both in Europe and overseas countries, at the same time endeavouring to ensure a suitable geographical distribution in such a way as to relieve the population pressure which at present exists on the frontiers of certain Member States of the Council of Europe;

(ii) shall make suggestions for the financing of any such measures;

(iii) shall propose suitable means for safeguarding the cultural interests,

and facilitating the vocational training of young refugees;

(iv) shall establish permanent liaison with the qualified representatives of Governments of Member States of the Council of Europe, with O. E. E. C., the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and intergovernmental organisations dealing with the problems of refugees, overpopulation, and emigration, in order to foster their activities and avoid any duplication of effort:

(v) shall establish relations with the representative refugee associations and with the religious and lay welfare organisations, both national and

international;

(vi) shall endeavour, in connection with the legal protection of refugees, to induce Member States of the Council of Europe to grant to refugees at least the legal status for which provision is made in the Convention on the Status of Refugees signed at Geneva on 28th July 1951, and, furthermore, to facilitate as far as possible the free movement of refugees

to facilitate as far as possible the free movement of refugees.

2. Recommends to the Committee of Ministers, with a view to ensuring continuity of action by the Council of Europe, the appointment by the Committee of Ministers, on the proposal of the Special Liaison Committee, of a "Special Repre-

¹This Recommendation was adopted by the Assembly at its Thirty-fourth Sitting, 7th December 1951. (See Doc. 72, Report of the Special Committee on Refugees.)

sentative," who should be a well-known European personality. The duties of the "Special Representative" shall be, as the delegate of the Special Liaison Committee, to act as the representative of the Council of Europe to the various international organisations concerned with the problem of refugees and overpopulation; to encourage any initiatives which may be taken with a view to opening negotiations on this problem between the Governments of Member States of the Council of Europe, and to stimulate the practical application of any measures which may be adopted.

3. Recommends to the Committee of Ministers that, before any final decision is taken on the proposal for the establishment of a European Office for Refugees, which has been reserved by the Committee of Ministers, this proposal should be referred for consideration to the Special Liaison Committee, which should submit

a reasoned Report thereon.

RECOMMENDATION 14 ON THE ADOPTION BY MEMBER STATES OF THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE OF A COMMON POLICY IN SOCIAL MATTERS 1

The Assembly,

Considering that European society is based upon the respect for the dignity of man, and has as its aim the betterment of his conditions,

Considering that the unification of the social legislation of the Member States represents an essential step in the progressive unification of Europe,

Recommends to the Committee of Ministers that a common policy in social matters should be adopted by Member States of the Council of Europe.

(a) European Code of Social Security.

The efforts of the Council of Europe towards the creation of a European Code of Social Security, based on Assembly Recommendation 28 adopted on the 24th August, 1950, should be continued, in close collaboration with the International Labour Organisation.

(b) European Manpower Problems.

In accordance with the need which gave rise to Assembly Recommendation 3, adopted on the 14th May, 1951, the Council of Europe should participate effectively in the solution of the European manpower problem.

c) Housing.

The Assembly Recommendation 31, adopted on the 26th August, 1950, calling for a Committee of Experts to draw up a programme of collaboration relating to housing, and the creation of a Technical Building Centre, should be put into effect.

(d) Ratification of Labour Conventions.

Joint action should be undertaken within the framework of the Council of Europe for the purpose of furthering the general ratification of international conventions adopted by the International Labour Organisation. With this in view a Committee of Experts on labour conditions should be appointed to study the obstacles which exist in the Member States to the ratification of these conventions, as well as the means to hasten ratification.

(e) Social Aspects of the Action undertaken within the framework of the

Organisation for European Economic Co-operation.

The Council of Europe should follow closely the social aspects of the action undertaken by European States within the framework of the O. E. E. C., and particularly the measures relating to migration within Europe.

(f) Relations between the Council of Europe and the Specialised Authorities, The Council of Europe should follow closely the social effects of the establishment and activities of the Specialised Authorities, particularly of the Coal and Steel Pool. The purpose would be primarily to detect any risks threatening the social conditions in the Member States of the Council of Europe as a result of the activities of the specialised authorities, and to endeavour to ensure common action by its Member States to counteract such risks. Secondly, and on a long-term basis, the Council of Europe should study common arrangements in the social field which might be developed by the States participating in the specialised authorities.

(g) Contact between the Social Administration of the Member States.

The Council of Europe should study methods of ensuring regular contacts between the social administrations of the Member States, taking into ac-

¹This Recommendation was adopted by the Assembly at its Thirty-fourth Sitting, 7th December 1951. (See Doc. 67, Report of the Committee on Social Questions.)

count the experiences of the Brussels Treaty Powers and the Scandinavian countries in the establishment of such contacts.

(h) General Observations.

The Council of Europe should seek to avoid any duplication of effort in the social field with the work being carried on by other organisations. It should therefore endeavour to ensure the essential co-ordination of these various activities, in collaboration with the organisations in question.

APPENDIX VIII. TABLES ON DOLLAR GAP

"The trade deficit of all OEEC countries combined, which was \$1.7 billion in the first half of 1950 and \$0.7 billion in the second half, rose to \$2.1 billion in the first half of 1951. The effect on the deterioration in the terms of trade can be assessed from the fact that, if prices had remained unchanged since Korea, the trade deficit in the first half of 1951 would have been less than \$0.8 billion, i. e., the net cost of the adverse change in the terms of trade amounted to \$1.3 billion in the first 6 months of this year and has materially affected Western Europe's struggle toward external stability."

(Note.-Figures and text from OEEC.)

TRADE

The level of Western Europe's trade with Eastern Europe

A topic securities the acception of a European of a Alexander Presentation 28 adouted	1938	1948	1949	1950
Trade at constant prices: Imports Exports.	3. 170 1. 137	980 670	930 820	899 712
Index numbers of volume: Imports Exports	100	31 59	29 72	28 63
Percentage of Western Europe's total trade: Imports. Exports.	9 6	4 4	4 5	3

Source: Economic Bulletin for Europe, 2d quarter 1951, Geneva, October 1951 (pp. 49-66).

General remark: The heading "Eastern European Countries" covers in the following: Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Bulgaria, and the Soviet Union.

Exports of 11 Western European countries to Eastern Europe, by commodity groups

Commodity group	Index numbers 1938=100				
	1948	1949	1950		
1. Food, drink, and tobacco. 2. Raw materials 3. Metals and manufactures 4. Machinery 5, 6. Vehicles and other transport equipment 7. Chemicals 8. Textiles 9. Other manufactures 10. Unspecified	86 97 32 68 79 47 18 38 90	86 78 46 103 92 70 27 60 148	41 53 45 128 74 50 29 37 96		
Total, groups 1 to 10	59	72	63		

The decline from the prewar level of exports from Western European countries was fairly general for the commodity groups specified in the table. Machinery was the only group which reached—and in 1950 exceeded—the prewar volume. At the same time, however, exports of machinery from the United States, which, after Germany, was the largest supplier to Eastern Europe before the war, have almost completely disappeared. In total, therefore, supplies of machinery to the countries of Eastern Europe from the highly industrialized countries outside the area remained in 1948 and 1949 at about three-quarters of the prewar volume and only in 1950 approached it.

Exports of Eastern European countries to Western Europe in 1950 [Millions of dollars in current prices.]

Commodity group	Czech- oslo- vakia	Poland	U. S. S. R.	Hun- gary	Ru- mania	Bul- garia	Total of 6 coun- tries	Yugo- slavia
1. Food, drink, tobaccoOf which	41.9	71.3	80. 6	54. 3	7.7	5.8	261. 6	30.1
Grains and flour	9.0	7.8	73.0	18. 2	3.3	1.3	112.6	12.6
Meat	4.6	41.8	.1	18.9	1.0		66.4	7. 2
2. Raw materialsOf which	36. 4	142. 2	61. 4	7.0	4.0	.3	251. 3	50.1
Ores	1.2		3.7				4.9	3.9
Coal and coke	20. 2	129.7	6. 2	.3			156. 4	1.4
Timber	3.8	10.3	29.4	.1		20000000	43.6	31. 1
3. Metals and manufacturers Of which Raw and semimanufactured	17.8	7.1	6. 7	1.9			33. 5	9. 1
	10.3	6.6	6.4	1.2			24. 5	8.2
metals		1.0	. 5	1.6			15. 7	0, 4
4. Machinery	12. 6							
port equipment	13.4	.3	.9	.3			14. 9	
7. Chemicals Of which	4.7	4.6	3. 6	1.1	1.		14.1	1.7
Fertilizers		.8	3.1				3.9	
8. Textiles	21.8	4.7	3.8	2,1	.2		32.6	.:
9. Other manufactures	26. 7	3.9	11.6	1.7	.4	.4	44.7	1.2
10. Unspecified	21.0	3.7	8.9	.6	.5	.3	35.0	1.2
Total, groups 1 to 10	196.3	238.8	178.0	70.6	12.9	6.8	703.4	97.0

APPENDIX IX. CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY MOTION REGARDING THIS AND FUTURE MEETINGS

CONSULTATIVE ASSEMBLY

THIRD ORDINARY SESSION

(Second part)

MOTION RELATING TO THE CONFERENCE BETWEEN A DELEGATION OF THE ASSEMBLY AND A DELEGATION OF THE AMERICAN CONGRESS

The Assembly expresses its thanks to both Houses of Congress for their action in appointing a delegation of their members to confer on matters of common

interest with a delegation representing the Assembly.

The Assembly has studied with close attention and very great interest the reports of the Conference which met immediately before the present session; and concurs with the opinion, expressed in the final declaration of the American members of the Conference, that the discussions were most useful in clarifying the views of all participants, and warmly reciprocates the American delegation's acknowledgment of the candour and cordiality with which the Conference was conducted.

The Assembly is of the opinion that the proceedings fully justify its belief that frank discussion between parliamentarians of the United States and of Western Europe is the best way of disclosing the state of opinion on both sides of the Atlantic and by so doing must lead to a better understanding of our respective problems and contribute to the greater solidarity of the Western

World.

The Assembly ventures to express the hope that the contact established at this first meeting will be renewed from time to time.

Adopted unanimously in the Assembly on Tuesday, December 11, 1951.

APPENDIX X. EXCERPT FROM MUTUAL SECURITY ACT OF 1951

TITLE I-EUROPE

Sec. 101. (a) In order to support the freedom of Europe through assistance which will further the carrying out of the plans for defense of the North Atlantic area, while at the same time maintaining the economic stability of the countries of the area so that they may meet their responsibilities for defense, and to further encourage the economic unification and the political federation of Europe, there are hereby authorized to be appropriated to the President for the fiscal year 1952 for carrying out the provisions and accomplishing the policies and purposes of this Act—

(1) not to exceed \$5,028,000,000 for assistance pursuant to the provisions of the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of 1949, as amended (22 U. S. C. 1571–1604) * * *.

The Assembly vontures to express the hope that the contact established at the first mostlog will be removed from time to time. Adopted manifementy in the Assembly on Trassley, December 17, 1951.